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Abstract
Our aim in this thesis is to investigate the usefulness of real options analysis, taking case
studies of problems in real estate. In the realm of real estate, we consider the following three
problems. First, we consider the valuation and usefulness of presale contracts of
condominiums, which can be viewed as similar to call options on condominiums. Secondly,
we consider the valuation of farm land from the perspective of land developers, who may
think of farm land as being similar to call options on subdivision lots. Third, we consider the
valuation of opportunities to install solar panels on properties, in which properties may be
considered call options on electricity generators. Through consultation with industry
professionals, we created models with the aim of being as realistic as possible without losing
analytical tractability. In all three problems, we assess the potential value added through the
usage of real options modeling techniques over more traditional techniques, using realistic
parameter regimes. We utilize a set of sophisticated mathematical and numerical tools to
mathematically model problems. We find that for some problems, real options models only
add minimal value to more traditional capital budgeting techniques such as the Net Present
Value model. In other problems, we find that real options models lead to significantly
different sets of conclusions from those predicted by more traditional techniques.

Keywords
Real Options, Real Estate, Presale, Condominiums, Subdivision, Solar Panels, Geometric
Brownian Motion, Stochastic Calculus, Monte Carlo Simulation.
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Chapter 1

1

Real Options Overview

1.1 Motivation
The seminal work of Black, Scholes and Merton (1973) revolutionized the financial world by
providing practitioners with a rational framework in which they could value European stock
options. The main hurdle that stood in the way of valuing options up to that point had been the
treatment of uncertainty. Without an objective method to model uncertainty, the non-linear
payoff structure of options made valuing them difficult. Using the Ito process, and working
under certain idealized conditions, Black, Scholes and Merton were able to present a valuation
model of options, the validity of which is supported by the ability of traders to make risk-free
profits whenever discrepancies between price and model arose.
We can also apply Black, Scholes and Merton’s methodology to value non-financial assets,
where significant elements of uncertainty underpin the valuation of such assets. Examples
include mines, oil wells, dams, factories and even technological research projects. The decision
to build one of these assets can be thought of as being similar to exercising an option, for in all
cases, the potential economic benefits derived from them are highly uncertain. Modeling such
assets is part art, since the modeller needs to determine which economic factors are relevant, and
in which way they should be modelled. However, it is also part science, since each model should
yield results that are congruent with reality. The art and science of rationally valuing such hard
assets using mathematics is the discipline of Real Options.
While the Black-Scholes model and subsequent financial option models have received rapid and
widespread acceptance in the financial industry, adoption of real options models have been slow
( Block, 2007). There are several reasons for the slow pace of adoption. Firstly, real options
generally require models with higher degrees of sophistication. While the assumptions
underlying the Black-Scholes model are close enough to reality to make them useful, the same
assumptions often do not hold for real assets. For instance, a practical real option model for a
certain asset might be a compound option. This adds complexity to the model, which often
hinders adoption.
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Second, using real options requires technical sophistication that many higher ranking managers
lack. While they could hire someone to model an asset, managers might not feel that they
themselves are able to fully understand the resulting model. It is understandable that managers
would not be comfortable with models they do not fully understand.
Finally, in most cases, mispriced assets do not create arbitrage opportunities to the advantage of
savvy investors. Investors can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in the financial markets
because the underlying stocks of call options can be shorted, and the ratio between options and
stocks can be adjusted flexibly. At least one of these conditions are usually not satisfied with real
assets. With no opportunities to make riskless profits from mispriced assets, the benefit of using
real options is more obscured, making it harder to persuade management to use them.
However, the reasons stated above do not preclude real options from being useful in the real
world. Real options analysis may not lead to arbitrage strategies, but it does lead to a more
accurate valuation of assets through the capital budgeting process, and equally important, it
advises on the optimal strategy to extract the maximum financial benefit from the usage of the
asset. One would reason that if there are significant benefits to be gained from employing real
options models, the models would be in wider use despite the barriers of use. But if real options
analysis doesn’t yield significant improvements on traditional capital budgeting models,
management may not feel compelled to overcome the barriers.
The traditional model of choice for capital budgeting has been the Net Present Value (NPV)
model. This method of analysis fixes all variables to constant values. The modeller estimates
present and future cash flows, discounting future cash flows to the degree that they reflect the
riskiness of the project being modeled. Unlike real options analysis, NPV models do not advise
on the optimal time to exercise. Rather, they advise on whether to exercise or not today.
We can take an oil well as an example to illustrate the NPV approach. To model an oil well using
NPV, we estimate values of variables such as present and future prices of oil, capital costs,
operating costs and taxes. In a spreadsheet, an analyst would lay out expected cash flows over a
time horizon. Future cash flows are discounted to incorporate the time value of money, and then
added up. This sum is the NPV of the oil well. If the NPV is positive, it is deemed economical to
build the oil well today. An example is given in Table 1-1.

3

Year

0

1

2

3

Oil price (per barrel)

80

90

100

110

Number of barrels produced

0

200

100

50

Revenue

0

18000

10000

5500

Operating Expenditures

0

3000

3000

3000

Capital Expenditures

10000

0

0

0

Undiscounted net cash flow

-10000

15000

7000

2500

Discounted cash flow (discounted @ 10%/year)

-10000

13636

5785

1878

Table 1-1 Cash flows of a hypothetical oil well.

In this example, the value of the opportunity is the sum of the discounted cash flows, which is
$11,299. Since this number is positive, the recommendation would be to start building the well
today.
The drawback of using the NPV method is that the recommended action may not be the optimal
action that maximizes the financial potential of assets. This is especially true in instances where
future revenue stream is uncertain. Let us again consider the example of the oil well. If we
believe that oil prices going to double in year 2, and increase more slowly thereafter, it would not
be optimal to start building the well today. Rather, it would be optimal to wait this year and build
the well next year, or perhaps even later. Assuming that we will build the oil well at the optimum
point in time, the value of the well (V) can be described mathematically as follows
.
In the above equation, t is the time at which the oil company decides to build the well. This type
of analysis can be completed rather easily for the types of problems where future revenue is
deterministic. However, it becomes more complicated when revenue is uncertain. For instance,
while one can try to divine the future price of oil, the reality is that oil prices move in a stochastic
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fashion that are quite hard to predict. In such cases, the optimal decision that would get the most
out of an oil well, would also depend on the price of oil. For example, in an extreme case, if oil
was at $1/barrel, and it cost $30/barrel to produce at some time in the future, it would not be
optimal to build the oil well. On the other hand, if oil was at $200/barrel, and if oil prices will in
all likelihood decline from that level, it would be optimal to build the well at that time.
The land owner need not exercise the option to build an oil well today, but rather wait until there
is more relevant information. The NPV method does not allow room for the option of waiting. In
contrast, the art and science of analyzing the optimal decision, and the value of the asset
assuming the owner exercises at the optimal moment, is the heart of real options modeling.

1.2

Solution Methodologies

Modeling and solving problems using real options is non-trivial. Unlike for financial options, in
which the traded contracts clearly identify all the value drivers, one must identify the myriad of
factors that affect the valuation of each asset under consideration. Our aim is to create simple
models that capture the essence of each asset, only incorporating factors which materially
influence the economics of each asset. However, it’s often difficult to know the importance of
each factor in advance, and it is part of the purpose of this thesis to investigate which factors
prove to be material in the real world.
Our models involve the use of stochastic variables. A common model is one in which an asset or
other variable follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). GBM describes a variable whose
percentage change in incremental value is normally distributed with mean ( ) and standard
deviation ( ). Mathematically, it is expressed using the Wiener process (

) as follows.

.
For this thesis, it is assumed that the reader understands at least the elements of stochastic
calculus. The focus of this thesis will be on extracting business insights rather than on advancing
the mathematical theory of real options. While all mathematical statements will be precise and
correct, at times technical conditions will not be mentioned when their inclusion would distract
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the reader with mathematical detail, obscuring the larger picture. An introduction sufficient for
our purposes here may be found, for example, in “Paul Wilmott on Quantitative Finance” (
Wilmott P. , 2006). The principle of dynamic optimization is used to construct real options
models in this thesis. There are a number of books that outline dynamic optimization (see Dixit
& Pindyck, 1994). Apart from dynamic optimization, one can also use contingent claims analysis
to create real options models. However, contingent claims analysis can only apply if the
underlying asset is spanned by existing assets – i.e. a portfolio of existing assets can be
assembled to precisely match the economic characteristics of the asset under analysis. As we
shall see, that assumption does not apply to the types of assets analyzed in this thesis, and
therefore we focus our efforts on utilizing dynamic optimization.
The principle of dynamic optimization is centered on asking the following questions at each
decision point - do we exercise the option or wait? Assuming we can extract the most economic
value by making optimal decisions, what is the value of the asset given that the owners require a
specific rate of return?
For the owner of asset

to achieve a specific rate of return , the change in the value of the asset

must match this rate. This may be mathematically written as follows.
.
The right hand side of this equation is particular to each asset. As a simple example, let’s assume
that we can build a mine capable of producing one unit of minerals valued Xt at time t. Once we
decide to build the mine and pay M, we get X instantly. X follows GBM, and the mineral rights
of the land expires in time T. Since this is a stochastic process, we must use Ito’s lemma to find
the function’s differential. Using the lemma, we have
.
Taking expectations over the random variable given by

, we have
.
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This equation is identical to the Black Scholes equation, except that the discount rate may not
equal the risk-free rate. This is because there are no ways to achieve riskless profits in the
absence of a replicating portfolio. Instead of representing “The” price of the asset as with the
replicating argument, the real options equation represents the expected value of the asset if
managed as recommended. However, the equation can be solved using the same methodology
used to solve the Black Scholes equation.
In this thesis, we’ve compensated the holder of the option by allowing for the presence of risk
premiums. In the standard Black Scholes equation, the discount rate required by the holder of the
option is equal to the risk free rate. Whenever the discount rate is different to the risk free rate,
the difference between the discount rate and the risk free rate is the risk premium. Such
premiums may be necessary to compensate the holder of assets investigated in this thesis, since
it’s not possible for the holders to hedge the assets. However, the introduction of the risk
premiums is not the only way one can compensate option holders. One can also introduce
different utility functions that layer onto the payoff functions to reflect the risk aversion of the
option holder. For example, such a utility function can demand that any possible losses are
magnified by a multiplicative factor. However, we choose not to employ utility functions in this
paper for the following reasons – to keep with industry practices, because utility functions are
hard to accurately measure, and because we want payoffs to be linear for a company which may
deal with a portfolio of options.

1.3

Focus

There are many areas in business where one can apply the real options paradigm. In this thesis,
the focus will be on problems in real estate. Real estate was an attractive subject for several
reasons. One, there are relatively few papers regarding the application of real options on real
estate. Yet, the real estate sector is a significant component of the economies of nearly every
country around the world, and it is one that occupies a significant place in the hearts and minds
of ordinary people. It is a sector that is amenable to real options analysis, as real estate prices are
unpredictable.
There are many real options problems one can investigate in real estate. In this thesis, we have
chosen to focus our attention to the following three problems. In chapter 2, we investigate the
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value of pre-sale contracts of condominiums. Developers usually sell new condominiums
through a presale, whereby purchasers make down payments to enter into contracts that allow
them to purchase finished condominiums on a later date at a predetermined price. The presale
can be thought of as a call option for the purchaser on the condominium. In this chapter, we
value the presale contract from both the purchaser's and the developer's points of view. We also
analyze the extent of risk sharing between the purchasers and the developers according to
varying levels of down payments.
In chapter 3, we present a real option based model for the valuation of vacant urban land with
residential zoning. The model incorporates several factors that were overlooked by earlier papers
in the subject, as we strove to reflect business realities more accurately. These factors include the
treatment of land as a compound option, the introduction of mean-reversion to subdivision lot
prices, incorporation of property taxes, and the introduction of time lags associated with waiting
on regulatory permits. The model is tailored to market conditions in London, Ontario, Canada,
and we compare results with prevailing market prices and observed developer behaviour. We use
the model to present a quantitative discussion of the risks associated with undertaking such land
development projects. We present a model that is realistic and computable, and that which
incorporates key parameters that drive the value of vacant land. We show that neither taxes nor
rents are, in realistic parameter regimes, particularly material. However, it is shown that
regulatory uncertainty plays a more important role, particularly as it relates to the mean and
variance of permit approval times.
In chapter 4, we model the option to install solar panels on private property. Solar panels can be
installed on rooftops or on the ground, and owners are able to either produce electricity for their
own use, or sell it into the grid. Making some assumptions about the behaviour of electricity
prices and installation costs, we build a model that examines the economic value of owning such
an option for the property owner. We also examine the problem from the perspective of
governments who wish to foster solar industries within their jurisdictions, by encouraging as
much installations as possible. We examine the implications of implementing different subsidy
regimes, and we determine the optimal way to implement such subsidies. We also compare and
contrast the conclusions derived from applying the NPV and Real Options approaches.
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Each problem we’ve examined is self-contained, and offers various insights that are of specific
interest to the problem being considered, even if those insights may not be directly related to the
examination of real options analysis. But there is a common thread that binds each of the
problems. We’ve strived to build real options models that are as realistic as possible, leveraging
our correspondence with industry professionals. We compare valuations and optimal decisions
inferred from using real options models, and compare them against those inferred from using
NPV models. As such, we hope this thesis can provide some insights as to the value of real
options to real estate decision makers in practice, as distinct from the in-theoretical principle. We
summarize our findings and conclusions in chapter 5, where we also discuss possible future
work.
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Chapter 2

2

Value of Presale Contracts of Condominiums

Developers of large building projects regularly sell units before construction in order to raise
capital. With this capital, they are able to secure loans used to build properties. In order to secure
bank financing, developers must sell a minimum number of units (Belford, 2008). By selling
their units before they are built, both developers and the banks which finance them benefit from
lower uncertainty.
Comparatively little analysis of the presale process has appeared in the literature. Chang and
Ward ( 1993) analyzed the implications to developers, viewing presales as forward contracts.
Yiu and Wong ( 2005) investigated the feedback relationship between existing condo prices and
presale prices. Yiu et al. ( 2009) studied the impact of noise traders on volume and price
dispersion of presale contracts. Leung et al. ( 2007) used a linear regression to model the price of
a presale contract in terms of a few independent variables such as market price of existing
condominiums, interest rate and hidden forward risks.
Lai et al. ( 2004) laid the foundation of a real option based analysis. This chapter treated the
problem from the view both of the purchaser and the developer of a condominium unit in an
environment in which both parties demanded a risk free rate of return on their investments. They
presented property price data from Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taipei which showed the long
term price changes as well as short term price volatilities. From this, they surmised that the price
could be modeled using Geometric Brownian Motion.
The present work builds on the foundation of the Lai paper. After correcting a small but
important error in their work (see Appendix A), we form a more sophisticated and realistic
model.
Chan et al. ( 2008) have also taken the options approach to the treatment of presale contracts.
Our models assume that condo prices move in a lognormal fashion more similar to that of stocks,
whereas property prices in Chan et. al.'s model are normally distributed. We also allow
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uncertainty in the construction cost by treating the cost as a stochastic variable, whereas Chan et.
al assumes a deterministic construction cost.
Crucially, whereas Chan et. al. focused only on minimizing the purchaser's payments, we have
also taken into account the profit potential through immediate sales upon completion of the
property. This can best be illustrated with a hypothetical scenario. Suppose the original purchase
price is $100,000 and the down payment is $20,000. Let's also suppose the condo price has 50%
chance of doubling to $200,000 and 50% chance of halving to $50,000. The buyer according to
Chan et. al. would seek to minimize the cost, so she would be faced with 50% chance of paying
$80,000 and 50% chance of paying $30,000. However in our model, the buyer would consider
the profit potential: 50% chance of earning $100,000 and a 50% chance of losing $20,000. These
are fundamentally different considerations that yield different fair values for the same
condominium units.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.1 we explain prevalent business practices
and justify our assumptions and parameters. In section 2.2 we investigate the problem from the
purchaser's point of view, calculating the fair down payment value and the extent of risk sharing.
In section 2.3 we investigate the problem from the developer's point of view. We calculate the
extent of risk sharing through participation in a presale, and compare the benefits against that of
not holding a presale. In section 2.4, we finish the main body of our text with conclusions. We
present our analysis of Lai et al.’s model in Appendix A. We justify our reasons for choosing the
lognormal process to model condo price movements in Appendix B. In Appendices C and D, we
give details of our calculations regarding the value of the purchaser's option and the variance of
the purchaser's profitability, respectively.

2.1 Business Overview
This section gives a brief overview of the general practices for buying and selling a condo via a
presale contract. We state our assumptions regarding the movement of condo prices and
construction costs, and we estimate reasonable values for parameters involved in our model. We
note that the parameters selected here are for the purpose of scenario generation and do not
represent the fruits of a detailed econometric study.

11

Symbol

Parameter Description

Base Case

Down payment amount

Output of Analysis

Final payment amount

$400,000

Condominium price

Variable

Construction cost

Variable

Initial construction cost

$350,000

Penalty to opt out of contract

$0

Brokerage fee

5%

Total time between down payment and final payment

4 years

Expected annual rate of appreciation

4%

Risk-free interest rate for purchaser

4%

Interest rate for construction loan

6%

Volatility of condo prices

11%

Volatility of construction cost

2%

Correlation between condo price and construction cost

Tunable Parameter

Risk Premium required by purchaser

5%

Risk Premium required by developer

6.75%

Table 2-1: Parameter descriptions and their base case values, placed at beginning of chapter for easy
reference.

A typical presale involves the following steps: The purchaser agrees to pay two pre-specified
amounts when she agrees to enter into a contract with the developer. The first amount is the
down payment

, paid by the purchaser at the time of the agreement. The down payment is

usually not a single lump sum but a series of monthly payments for the first three or four months.
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Since the down payments are close together in time, we approximate the series of down
payments as one lump sum. When construction is nearly complete, the purchaser makes the final
payment

. The construction time

is typically 4 years.

In Canada, the down payment ratio must be at least 20% as of 2008 (i.e.

is normally 20% of

). This ratio is set by the Government of Canada as part of the rules governing mortgage
insurance. If a buyer wants to make a down payment less than 20%, she is obligated to purchase
mortgage insurance to protect the mortgage lender. Since mortgage insurance is expensive,
purchasers generally make the 20% down payment.
Presold condo prices vary widely, with a typical total price being $500,000 for a condo in a big
city in 2008. This means a typical

would be around $100,000 while a typical

about $400,000. We can fix either of
$400,000 and vary the value of

or

would be

and vary the other. In this chapter, we set

to be

.

From the purchaser's point of view, the presale contract is similar to a call option on the
condominium. The difference is that failing to “exercise" the option may be penalized. We
assume condo prices S follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), motivating this
assumption in Appendix B. Using the National Housing Price Index (StatCan, 2009), we
estimate the annual appreciation rate

to be 4% per annum under normal market conditions.

This is lower than some of other reported measures. For example, an online resource RealEstate
ABC ( 2004) reports that house prices have been appreciating at a 6% rate on average from 1968
until 2004. The major reason for this divergence is the adjustment StatCan makes for housing
improvements in creating their price indices, which other measures don't capture.
The purchaser may or may not be free to walk away from the contract after making the down
payment. In some markets, a penalty
situation is modeled by choosing
only make the final payment if

must be paid to opt out of the contract. The no penalty
. We assume that purchasers exercise rationally and will
. Otherwise, she will cancel the contract. We are

aware that purchasers may not be completely rational in their decision to honour the contract.
However, as Forsyth and Karp (2008) reveal, the assumption is approximately true. Since
, the purchaser is always better off honouring the contract than walking away from the deal if
. Therefore, when considering legal environments in which the purchaser cannot walk

13

away from the deal, the choice

is appropriate. However, unless otherwise stated, this

chapter assumes the purchaser can walk away without penalty (i.e.
Rather than entering into a presale contract, the purchaser can set
assets earning

).
aside to invest in risk free

per year. Since we assume the purchaser makes the down payment using her

savings, we take

to be the rate of return on savings, rather than interest paid on borrowed

money. The purchaser's risk-free rate (yield on GICs) has historically been around 4% annually
for a 4 year term.
The developer posts the down payments as collateral against their bank loans. After developers
post adequate collateral, they receive bank loans with interest rate

. This rate varies from

developer to developer, but their annual reports show it to be in the 5-7% range (NVR, 2008,
Hovnanian, 2008, KB Home, 2008, M/I Homes, 2008).
Company

NVR

Hovnanian

KB Home

M/I Homes

2003

75.3%

74.5%

77.5%

75.0%

2004

74.4%

74.5%

76.0%

74.6%

2005

72.2%

73.6%

73.2%

74.9%

2006

77.9%

76.9%

77.3%

75.3%

2007

83.7%

84.9%

86.7%

81.9%

Average

76.7%

76.9%

78.1%

76.3%

Table 2-2: The construction cost margin of some publicly traded companies which participate in
condominium construction. Data retrieved from the respective annual reports.

Once the project is financed, the developer builds the condominium. The construction cost
includes materials and labour cost, and varies over the period. We assume

also follows GBM

with expected appreciation . We estimate the initial construction cost based on the following
calculations. Table 2-2 depicts the % of gross revenue reported by major publicly traded
developers. Average construction cost per unit revenue is 77%. This implies construction after
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time

costs

. Since we expect costs to increase at rate , we

discount the value by

over

years to get roughly $350,000.

If the price of the condominium decreases to the point where the purchaser walks away, the
developer must find another purchaser for the newly finished unit. To sell a condo, the
developers usually work through a broker, who charges a percentage

of the value of the

condominium. According to SmartMoney (Todorova, 2007), the standard quoted brokerage fee
is at around 6%, but actual brokerage fees range from around 4.5 to 5.5%. We use 5%
throughout this chapter.
The volatility of condominium prices are denoted by
denoted by

, and the volatility of construction costs is

. Throughout this chapter, we use de Jong and Driessen’s (2008) estimate for the

total volatility of a residential property of 11% per annum. From the composite construction cost
price index, we see that the average standard deviation of the index is around 1.75% per year,
which we round to 2%. We believe that purchasers and developers require a rate of return above
that of the risk free rate to compensate for the risk of losses. Unlike for stocks, condos cannot be
traded during the time that the contract is in effect, so uncertainty cannot be hedged away by
either the purchasers or the developer. To compensate, they both require annual risk premiums
which we denote by

for the purchaser and

for the developer. Shilling ( 2003) studied the

risk premium for real estate investments. However, he dealt with investments in existing
properties, so his results (6-6.75%) are not directly applicable here. Leung et al. (2007) studied
the risk premium on presale contracts in Hong Kong, estimating them at around 5% for the
purchaser.
We calculate the developer's risk premium using their reported gross margins. The cost of sales
include expenses related to land acquisition, construction and development specific financing
cost. Since financing costs are included in cost of sales, the return beyond the risk-neutral rate is
where

is the gross profit margin. This is the total return over

annual rate is therefore
rate of annual risk premium.

. Using

and

years. The

, we take 6.75% to be the
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2.2

Analysis of the Purchaser's Position

We present calculations showing the value of the presale contract for the purchaser in this
section. In contrast to the assumptions required to derive the Black-Scholes equation for stock
options, delta hedging is not possible for purchasers since condos cannot be continuously
purchased and sold. An appropriate discount rate must be chosen to compensate the purchaser
for her risk. We first derive the value of the contract where the purchaser is risk-neutral, and
show the risk profile that arises from investing in the contract. We then introduce a risk premium
and show the changes in valuation and risk profile.

2.2.1

Valuation under Risk Neutral Environment

The value of the presale of condominium contracts to the purchaser can be calculated using the
principles of dynamic optimization as expounded by Dixit and Pindyck ( 1994). At each decision
period, the decision maker chooses the option that maximizes his expected profit over the whole
time period. The equation that expresses these dynamics is called the Bellman equation.
Assuming the purchaser is risk-neutral, the expected profit potential for choosing to invest in the
presale contract is expressed in the following Bellman equation.

(2-1)

.

where C is the price of the presale contract on a condo, with values of

evolving in a GBM

.
where W is a Wiener process. However, it is worth reiterating that since there is no early
exercise, only the initial and final condo prices are relevant. The assumption of GBM does not
need to hold for us to calculate the solutions. It is only necessary that the final condo prices be
log normally distributed. Equation (2-1) requires final and boundary conditions. Under the
assumption of rational exercise, the final condition at t = T can be written in the forms
.

(2-2)
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If

ever falls to zero, it remains there until final time T. Therefore, the boundary condition at S =

0 is

discounted to present value. The value is discounted since the

payment of A occurs in the future. At

, there is no chance that the value of

will fall

sufficiently for the purchaser to walk away. Therefore, the boundary condition at

is

, discounted to present value. In summary, the boundary conditions are
,
.
The solution for

can now be written in the form
,

(2-3)

where

,
.
The derivation of the formula can be found in Appendix B. Assuming the purchaser behaves
rationally, she will only make the down payment

for the presale if

. Otherwise,

the purchaser is expected to earn less than the risk-free rate of return and is better off not
purchasing the condo.
Some solution curves of

are plotted in Figure 2-1. The solution curves are plotted where

there is no penalty to opt out, and when the purchaser cannot opt out of the contract (The
maximum penalty case). Contract values under boom and bust conditions are also investigated,
with

taking on the rate of appreciation a purchaser sees as likely for the next

years (in this

case, 4 years). The dotted lines mark the prevailing down payment rate.
We can draw a few conclusions from looking at the solution curves. First, the flexibility of the
purchaser to opt out of the contract does not materially affect the purchaser's valuation of the
contract at the prevailing down payment rate. The two solution curves merge very quickly for
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reasonable initial condominium prices of above $400,000. Assuming purchasers pay at or near
, we can expect the down payments to be similar regardless of whether the purchaser can
opt out or not.
Secondly, there is a substantial difference in contract valuations across boom and bust
conditions. The purchaser would pay the same down payment for a cheaper condominium in a
boom period than for a more expensive condominium in a bust period. This agrees with our
intuition that a down payment that secures the right to purchase an asset is worth more in a fast
rising market.
We cannot delta hedge and earn risk free returns by trading condominiums. Buying a contract for
less than its value can skew the odds of abnormal returns in the purchaser's favour, but it does
not guarantee it. Let us now look at the probabilities of buying or selling a presale contract. The
concept is related to the Value at Risk (VaR) used in financial institutions. While VaR is usually
calculated over days and weeks, we calculate our potential profit and loss over a period of
years.
How much a purchaser gains or loses from a presale is primarily determined by the final
outcome of the condominium price at the time of the final payment. The profit is calculated by
subtracting

(the value of the down payment at time T) and the final payment from the

final price of the condominium.
Since S is assumed to follow GBM, and is the only random variable for purchasers, we can
analytically calculate the probabilities of profit and loss for the purchaser of the condominium.
The probability of gains excluding sunk costs (i.e. down payment), is calculated as shown below.
The following equation shows the cumulative probability that gains made are under an arbitrary
value p.

.
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Figure 2-1: Top: No penalty and maximum penalty solutions. For a realistic range of condo prices, there is
little difference between the value of contracts containing opt-out provisions and those which do not. Realistic
prices occur near the intersection between the solid/dashed lines and the dotted line. For lower prices, this
contract provision is much more important. Bottom: Boom and bust environment solutions. Purchasers'
expectations about the rate of appreciation have a large effect on the perceived value of the presale contracts.
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The probability of the profit falling below
next calculations. Since

is 0. Therefore, we only consider

has a mean of

in the

and a standard deviation of

, the probability is

where

denotes the cumulative normal distribution function with mean

and variance

.

To calculate the total profit and loss distribution, we subtract the down payment from the gains
calculated above. It follows that

.

The graph depicting profit and loss distribution for select

values are given in Figure 2-2. As

a reminder, if we were to have a down payment to total payment ratio of 20%, the existing condo
value would have to be around

according to Figure 2-1.

The steep drop in probability in the curves in the top graph of Figure 2-2 may be attributed to the
purchaser's ability to opt out of the contract without a penalty – i.e. she can at most lose her
down payment. The magnitude of the drop corresponds to the probability that the purchaser will
opt out. Increasing

makes it more likely the purchaser will honor the contract. This is not

surprising, since the purchaser would have made a bigger down payment for higher
The curves for lower

in Figure 2-2 rise faster than for higher

.

with increasing profits.

Since the cumulative distribution curve reaches a higher point earlier in comparison to curves for
higher

, the probability of achieving large profitability is lower. When a purchaser makes a

smaller down payment, the purchaser is risking less money up front, so even though the
percentage rate of return on capital might be higher, the potential for large profitability in
absolute dollar terms is smaller.
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Finally, we investigate the median and worst case profitability scenarios, as well as the standard
deviation of profitability. The formula for the variance is calculated in Appendix D. The results
for various environments are tabulated in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3 shows that changing risk free rates for the purchaser do not affect the profitability.
This is because during calculation of the down payment as determined by
payment is discounted by the purchaser's risk free rate. To make a fair time

, the down
comparison, we

appreciate the down payment with the same risk free rate. These two influences combine to
negate the effects of the change in purchaser's risk free rate.
Although the purchaser on average breaks even on her investments, we see that even in the
median case, she records a loss, since the probability distribution of profitability is skewed to the
right. Figure 2-3 depicts this skewness under the maximum penalty environment. The skewness
to the right can be observed in all other environments we have examined in Table 2-3.
The influences of two factors explain the median profitability for different
is that as

values. The first

gets larger, the swings in the condo prices also become larger. We have seen that

the probability distribution of profitability is skewed to the right. The median profitability
declines to counteract the increased potential for profitability, keeping the average profitability at
zero. The other factor is the premium paid for the right to walk out of the contract. The
probability that the purchaser would benefit by reneging increases with lower

, so the

purchaser is made to pay more for the right to walk out. This results in a higher

and

negatively impacts the median profitability for lower

. These two factors oppose one

another. In contrast, if the purchaser is unable to walk out, we see a monotone decrease in the
median profitability with increasing

, since the median profitability is affected by the first

factor but not the second.
Given that a down payment of $100,000 would be appropriate for a condo roughly valued at
$435,000, the chance of opting out for the purchaser is at 15.9% in our standard environment,
higher than what our intuition would suggest. The introduction of the risk premium changes this
picture as we shall see in the next section.
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Figure 2-2: Cumulative probability distribution functions for profit, accounting for down payment. Top
graph displays the no penalty case, and the bottom graph displays the maximum penalty case. The
discontinuity in the top graph shows the limited risk borne by a purchaser when she can opt out - there is no
chance that she can make a loss greater than a set threshold.
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Environment

S(0)

Median

Worst 5%

Worst 1%

Default %

Std. Dev.

Standard Values

400,000

-24,181

-82,362

-82,362

26.9%

44,666

450,000

-17,587

-133,040

-133,040

12.5%

55,249

500,000

-15,781

-188,510

-188,510

5.1%

63,864

550,000

-16,016

-207,300

-246,010

2.0%

71,311

400,000

-11,223

-150,340

-194,760

0%

52,266

450,000

-12,626

-169,130

-219,110

0%

58,799

500,000

-14,029

-187,920

-243,450

0%

65,332

550,000

-15,432

-206,720

-267,800

0%

71,865

400,000

-17,516

-134,110

-134,110

12.3%

55,438

450,000

-15,731

-196,390

-196,900

4.5%

65,018

500,000

-16,246

-212,310

-261,199

1.5%

73,243

550,000

-17,517

-233,190

-302,060

0.5%

80,901

400,000

-44,343

-44,500

-44,500

47.1%

33,122

450,000

-24,367

-81,533

-81,533

27.2%

44,570

500,000

-18,096

-126,060

-126,060

13.9%

53,993

550,000

-15,959

-174,720

-174,720

6.4%

61,901

400,000

-24,181

-82,362

-82,362

26.9%

44,666

450,000

-17,587

-133,040

-133,040

12.5%

55,249

500,000

-15,781

-188,510

-188,510

5.1%

63,864

550,000

-16,016

-207,300

-246,010

2.0%

71,311

Max Penalty
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400,000

-24,181

-82,362

-82,362

26.9%

44,666

450,000

-17,587

-133,040

-133,040

12.5%

55,249

500,000

-15,781

-188,510

-188,510

5.1%

63,864

550,000

-16,016

-207,300

-246,010

2.0%

71,311

Table 2-3: Risk profile of holding a presale contract for different environments, assuming the purchaser
requires a risk free rate of return.

Figure 2-3: Comparison of the probability density function of purchaser's profitability against the normal
distribution of equal mean and variance. The profitability curve chosen represents the environment where
S(0) = 500,000 and where the purchaser is unable to opt out of the contract. The purchaser's profitability
profile is skewed to the right, which gives the purchaser a greater chance of earning outsized profits.
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2.2.2

Valuation under Risk Adjusted Return

In the previous subsection, we calculated the value of the contract when the purchaser demands
only the minimum rate of return. But since the contract's risk cannot be hedged away, we believe
that it is reasonable for the purchaser to demand a risk premium

, in which case the Bellman

equation must be modified to give
.

(2-4)

Figure 2-4: Comparison of solution curves between when a purchaser require risk free rates of returns, and
when she requires risk adjusted rates of returns. Solid curves denote the risk free curves and the dashed
curves denote the risk adjustedf curves. The differences between the curves are relatively small compared to
the scale of overall condo prices, but big enough push median profitability into the positive under most
circumstances.

25

Under the risk adjusted scenario, we do not need to adjust our solution methodology. Although
we expect the value of the contract to change, we do not expect the standard deviation of the
profits to change. This is because in calculating the profits
only change the fixed amount

, we

. Figure 2-4 compares risk free and risk adjusted solutions.

Environment

S(0)

Median

Worst 5%

Worst 1%

Default %

Std. Dev.

Standard Values

400,000

-9,251

-67,432

-67,432

26.9%

40,855

450,000

6,529

-108,920

-108,920

12.5%

51,777

500,000

18,389

-154,340

-154,340

5.1%

63,864

550,000

28,579

-162,700

-201,420

2.0%

71,311

400,000

1,358

-137,760

-182,180

0%

52,266

450,000

10,591

-145,910

-195,890

0%

58,799

500,000

19,824

-154,070

-209,600

0%

65,332

550,000

29,057

-162,230

-223,310

0%

71,865

400,000

6,795

-109,800

-109,800

12.3%

62,024

450,000

19,962

-156,430

-161,210

4.5%

65,018

500,000

31,245

-164,820

-214,500

1.5%

73,243

550,000

41,910

-173,760

-242,630

0.5%

80,901

400,000

-30,098

-36,434

-36,434

47.1%

33,112

450,000

-9,587

-66,754

-66,754

27.2%

44,457

500,000

4,755

-103,210

-103,210

13.9%

53,993

550,000

15,712

-143,050

-143,050

6.4%

61,901

Max Penalty

Table 2-4: Risk profile of holding a presale contract for different environments, assuming the purchaser
requires

above the risk free rate of return. The median profitability is generally positive with the addition

of the risk premium.

The top left graph of Figure 2-4 reveals that if the developer wishes to demand a $100,000 down
payment, the present value of the condominium developed should be $460,000. This is slightly
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under the total of $500,000 the purchaser is required to pay for both the down payment and the
final payment. By comparison, the present value should be $435,000 for the risk-neutral
purchaser.
Risk adjusted contracts should always be less valuable than risk free contracts. However, this
does not hold in the maximum penalty case shown in the top right graph, when the value of the
contract is less than zero. In such a case, the developer is expected to pay the purchaser to enter
into the contract, since the purchaser will be forced to pay

when the condo is finished. We

consider this scenario to be unrealistic.
The new risk profile for the purchaser is given in Table 2-4. Unlike in Table 2-3, the median
profitability for the purchaser is usually positive and monotonically increasing for

. Higher

leads to higher risk premium in absolute dollars demanded by the purchaser. Thus the
purchaser who takes a bigger risk by buying more expensive condos benefits more.

2.3

Analysis of the Developer's Position

In this section, we present calculations showing the value of the presale contract for the
developer. We assume that the developer requires a risk premium and show the risk profile that
arises from selling the contract.

2.3.1

Model and Analytical Solution

In modeling the value of the presale contract from the developer's perspective, we have to take
into account construction costs. The profit for a developer of a condo is the revenue resulting
from the project, less the cost associated with the construction of the condo.
The condo price is assumed to follow GBM as before. Since we are also taking into account
construction costs which we assume follow GBM with some correlation, we have two equations
as follows.
,

where

.
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The Bellman equation is formed on the same principle as was for the purchaser - the expected
gain from holding the presale contract is the same as the gain from earning a desired rate of
return. For the developer, this rate is the interest rate of the bank loan plus the risk premium.
Developers borrow money from banks to finance construction. Immediately after borrowing the
money, the developer has two alternatives. One is to repay the money to the bank. Interest not
paid is interest earned, and repaying the loan “earns" the developer money at the rate of the loan.
If the developer chooses to build, she must expect a return greater than the rate at which the loan
is negotiated. Otherwise, the developer would be assuming uncompensated risks. Therefore, the
developer requires a risk premium to increase the chance of profitability. The Bellman equation
which takes these factors into account is as follows.
(2-5)

This is almost identical to the multidimensional version of the Black-Scholes equation. There are
two differences. We allow

to differ from

, allowing rate of condo price appreciation to

diverge from risk free rates. We also see the presence of the risk premium

.

We can solve equation (2-5) analytically. The solution of the multidimensional Black Scholes in
terms of the payoff function is given by Wilmott ( 2006). We follow a similar solution but with
and including

.

,
(2-6)
.

At
receive

, the developer will receive

if

and in addition, she will sell the condo for

the final condition at

can be written as

. If

, the developer will
where B is the brokerage fee. Thus
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(2-7)

We have introduced
components involving

to emphasize that
and . In terms of

can be broken into separate

and , the integral in equation (2-6) becomes

.

The above equation consists of integrations over bivariate lognormal probability distributions.
Solving the inner integrals yields

.
The remaining integrals can be integrated using the same technique employed for calculating the
Purchaser's Position in Appendix C, yielding

.

Where

.
Substitute the results back into equation (2-6) to obtain

(2-8)
.
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Figure 2-5: Solution curves for the developer's real option. The curves represent the fair developer's presale
contract price in different environments. Near the realistic price of around $460,000, variations in the value
of expected price appreciation(top right) and initial construction cost(mid left) significantly impacts the price
of presale contracts. Variations in other factors do not appear to impact the prices as significantly.
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It might surprise the reader that the correlation coefficient
other words,

does not feature in equation (2-8). In

does not depend on whether condo prices and construction costs are

correlated. This is because the expected revenues and construction costs are separated by an
additive operand, as seen from the relation

.

Solution curves under select environments are graphed in Figure 2-5. Unless otherwise stated,
standard values presented in Table 2-1 are used. We remind the reader that the solution curves
are equal to the expected returns on fulfilling the contracts, without taking into account the down
payment. Also, note that since a presale contract is analogous to a call option, the payoff to the
developer appears similar to having sold a covered call option. The fair down payment varies for
each environment. We can make a few observations about the results.
The solutions incorporating no penalty and maximum penalty may seem very different at first
glance. However, we can see that for realistic values of existing condo prices, the value to the
developer is quite similar. As noted in section 2.2.2, the condo should be worth $460,000 today
if the developer were to charge a $100,000 down payment. For the solution curves at the
$460,000 point in the x axis and beyond, we can see that there is actually very little difference
between the two solution curves in the top left graph of Figure 2-5. There is actually very little
value in placing a clause in the contract that binds the purchaser to honour it, unless we are
negotiating for a condominium the present value of which is much lower than the purchaser's
total payment.
Contract values materially differ depending on the expected rate of condo value appreciation.
The contract is worth less to the developer when condo values are expected to appreciate more,
and vice versa. In effect, the developer has sold a call, capping his revenue on the condo price.
No matter how far the condo price appreciates, the developer can at most earn

, whereas

she is still responsible for paying the total construction cost. The cost, which rises with drift ,
hurts the developer's expected profit so the developer expects to earn more money when

is

lower. To compensate, the developer charges a higher down payment for a higher .
If the quoted initial construction cost is lower, then the developer is expected to make more
profit. This conclusion is reflected in the middle left graph of the figure, where the gap between
the two solution curves equal the difference between initial construction costs.
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There is very little difference between solution curves of different

values for

, as can be seen in the middle right graph. If the condo price is greater than $450,000 at
the time the contract is signed, there is only a small chance (12.5% in the standard environment)
that the condo price will depreciate so much that the purchaser will walk away. Since the
developer only pays a brokerage fee if the purchaser forfeits the condo unit, the impact of
brokerage fees to the developer is small for initial condo value over $450,000. However,
brokerage fees do make an impact when the contract is being negotiated for smaller initial condo
values, since then the purchaser is much more likely to default. At very small

, the impact of

the brokerage fee is hard to observe. Brokerage fees are proportional to the final condo price, and
so the expected fee is lower for smaller
Finally, the effects of changing

and

.
are similar, as can be expected from looking at

equation (2-5). Increase in either variable shifts the curves towards zero, reflecting the higher
discounting involved. The solution curves seem to converge to the same level for higher initial
condo prices for increasing

or

. However, this happens only because the regions where

contract values start levelling off are close to 0. A closer inspection of the graph reveals that two
curves do not meet.

2.3.2

Risk of Profit and Loss

In this section, we investigate the risk of taking on a condo construction project with a presale.
The profit that the condo developer takes at time

is
.

where the first term

comes from equation (2-7), and the second term is the down

payment plus interest accrued. We are assuming here that the purchaser pays the fair down
payment calculated in section 2.2.2.
In constructing the profit and loss profiles for the developer, we would like to know the realistic
range of values for . The correlation between the NHPI and the CPI is 0.57. Letting N be the
variable representing the path of the NHPI,
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Note that

has two components - the systematic component and the idiosyncratic

component(

). The idiosyncratic component incorporate mainly the property's location,

so we expect it to be uncorrelated to . The covariance of

and

is therefore

.

As a reminder, de Jong and Driessen’s (2008) estimation is that
Therefore, the correlation between

and

while

.

can be expected to be
.

Therefore, it would be useful to look at the risk profiles assuming

, and the higher and

lower s relative to the benchmark.
The profit and loss profiles under different environments are tabulated in Table 2-5. We have
used the Monte Carlo method to obtain our results. For each line of results, 100,000 pairs of
price paths for condo price and construction costs were generated. Some conclusions we can
draw from the table are as follows.
It appears that a higher

translates into less risk for the developer. We can understand this

because big losses accrue when condo price is low and construction cost is high. With a high
correlation, the chance of construction cost increasing while revenue decreasing is small, and this
leads to stable profits. The lower risk appears to come at the cost of a slightly smaller median
profit. The benefit of a higher correlation is non-existent for the maximum penalty case where
revenue, but not cost, is fixed.
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If

is small, we see a smaller profit, and vice versa. This is to compensate for the different rate

of return required for the developer. The down payment is calculated using the purchaser's risk
free rate

. At time , the value of money is adjusted using

. Therefore, unlike for the

purchaser, the effects do not cancel out and we have different risk profiles for different
Environment
Standard Values

S(0)
450,000

500,000

Max penalty

450,000

500,000

450,000

500,000

450,000

Median

Worst 5%

Worst 1%

values.

Std. Dev.

0

104,760

45,173

-3,060

27,378

0.3

103,850

53,447

6,836

24,960

0.6

103,080

60.774

19,901

22,076

0

155,760

120,530

77,619

21,083

0.3

155,140

122,020

89,817

19,602

0.6

154,980

124,080

100,560

17,996

0

103,240

75,371

63,257

16,471

0.3

103,050

75,334

63,081

16,446

0.6

103,070

75,275

63,154

16,430

0

155,150

127,300

115,160

16,422

0.3

155,190

127,200

115,190

16,426

0.6

155,250

127,460

115,460

16,409

0

110,090

73,677

37,912

22,035

0.3

110,510

75,537

49,903

20,733

0.6

110,170

76,805

57,285

19,336

0

169,350

136,200

117,590

19,710

0.3

169,240

136,880

121,200

19,027

0.6

169,130

137,140

122,760

18,587

0

101,430

8,285

-35,504

37,308

0.3

99,897

15,528

-25,148

34,138
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500,000

R(0)=300,000

450,000

500,000

450,000

500,000

450,000

500,000

0.6

98,517

23,050

-13,775

30,620

0

144,870

81,341

33,058

27,562

0.3

143,930

88,349

42,018

25,239

0.6

143,930

95,680

54,489

22,419

0

163,690

104,890

56,049

26,127

0.3

162,910

113,320

67,123

23,432

0.6

162,210

119,380

76.240

21,289

0

214,470

182,480

138,180

19,241

0.3

214,070

184,630

147,230

17,971

0.6

213,830

186,040

157,430

16,475

0

120,050

61,963

12,001

27,199

0.3

118,740

68,623

24,098

24,724

0.6

118,090

75,381

35,191

22,052

0

177,707

141,730

100,470

20,927

0.3

176,530

143,490

110,970

19,529

0.6

176,290

145,350

121,350

18,026

0

91,459

32,364

-16,999

27,461

0.3

90,536

40,267

-4,718

24,761

0.6

89,697

46,261

6,529

22,169

0

136,830

101,330

58,660

21,131

0.3

136,420

103,420

70,614

19,562

0.6

136,140

105,100

81,370

18,057

Table 2-5: Developer’s risk profile for a presale contract in different environments
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Additionally, we can draw the following conclusions from examining the table. The developer is
likely to earn more profit if the condo market appreciates faster, or if construction cost is initially
cheaper, or if the condo starts out with a higher initial value.

2.3.3

Comparison with No Presale

In this section, we compare the profit and loss profiles of developers who chose to hold a presale,
against that of those who chose not to hold a presale. For the purchaser, the risk profile for
buying a finished property is trivial - there is no risk involved since she is buying the finished
property. The total value

for the developer with a presale is
.

In other words, this is the sum of the down payment and the expected profit after construction.
Supposing that the purchaser and the developer agree at

. Then, the value for the

developer is

.

Note that should

, the formula simplifies considerably.
.

This must be compared with the situation where the developer simply holds on to the condos and
sell them for

at

. In this case we have a situation similar to that of holding a European

call option. The value of the opportunity

has a payoff of
(T).

Thus
=

.
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where

is the risk premium for when the developer does not hold a presale. This number is

expected to be higher than

because there is more risk associated with not holding a presale.

Thus we see that a developer at some price

at

will have a presale for a given value of

provided
.
If we were to incorporate fees from holding the presale, we can assume that the fees would be
similar whether the developer holds a presale or holds sales after construction. In that case, we
subtract similar values from the left and right hand side of the above equation, leaving the
inequality unchanged. Figure 2-6 compares

and

curves.

There is little difference between the two curves. The difference is more pronounced if

.

As long as the purchasers make down payments which equal the value of the contracts, the
developer can be expected to earn approximately the same amount through a presale, as she
would through selling finished units. For higher
because having a higher

, it makes more sense to hold a presale. This is

means the developer is more risk averse, and therefore is willing to

forgo more profit in favour of earnings stability. Holding

, the two curves stay very close

to each other even if we alter other environment variables. Table 2-6 shows the average deviation
between the two curves for a variety of environment factors.
The effects of altering

and

are the same as altering

and

, so we do not investigate them

separately. The shapes of the graphs remain mostly consistent through different environments.
When

and

are closer, the two solutions curves are closer together for higher existing condo

values. The two curves are closer together for lower existing condo values when

is lower.

The average deviation assuming all standard values is close to $10,000, which is not large
compared to the total amount of purchases involved. For reasonable condo prices above
$450,000, the total benefit developers expect from holding presales exceeds the amount that
developers expect from selling finished units. The source of this advantage resides in the
different

and

values. If they are equal, the curves are nearly equal to each other

for reasonable condo prices. With lower

, the purchaser is paying slightly more in down

payment, since she does not require as high a return on her savings as the developer.
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Figure 2-6: Comparison of the total profitability expected from holding presales ( ), to the profitability
expected from build condos without holding a presales ( ). Top:

- If risk premiums are held to be the

same, the profitabilities are roughly equal with holding presales having a slight advantage. Bottom:
- holding presales are more attractive if the developer requires a bigger risk premium for not holding
presales.
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Environment

Average Deviation

Standard values

$11,664

Max penalty

$19,449

R(0)=$300,000

$11,664

R(0)=$400,000

$11,664
$16,624
$9,677
$10,082
$14,041
$18,166
$4,878
$4,327
$20,483

Table 2-6: Average deviation between the total profitability expected from holding presales ( ) and
profitability expected if without presales ( ). Results shown are
calculated with

, with each

and

ranging over 700 to 700,000. The average deviations are often noticeable but not

material in the context of the overall sums of money usually involved ($450,000~$500,000).

2.4

Conclusion

This chapter computes values of presale contracts and discusses the consequences of entering
into presale agreements. The purchaser can expect, in the median case, to make a gain on her
investment above the risk free rate of return, provided the presale contract is priced to include a
risk premium. In return, the purchaser bears some of the risk that the developer would otherwise
assume. According to our model, the developer can expect at least as much profit from holding a
presale, as she would by not holding it. It appears that the reduction in risk comes at no cost to
the expected profitability for the developer. Given the lower risk to reward ratio expected by
holding a presale, we are not surprised to find that most development projects are sold through
presales.
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Developers are not required to sell all available units through a presale before starting
construction. The assumption is that developers will be able to sell the rest of the units through a
presale during construction, or sell them after they have been finished. However, it remains that
the more units they presell, the less risky the project. With the credit crisis making many lenders
anxious, the lenders have increased the percentage of units that needs to be presold from 60% to
70% ( Belford, 2008).
The profitability and the risk profile for both the purchaser and the developer are sensitive to the
expected rate of appreciation of the condominium. Both developers and purchasers suffer from
reduced profitability and increased uncertainty when μ is lower. Consequently, the current trend
in housing prices in the US significantly impacts the decisions made by both developers and
purchasers.
During 2008-9, the US had experienced a severe recession led by the housing market. The
seasonally adjusted Case-Shiller Home Price Index dropped an average of 1.7% per month from
October 2007 to September 2008. The decline in property prices leads purchasers to expect an
even further decline in prices. To compensate, purchasers will demand a lower final condo price
for the same down payment, than they would have in better times.
The low

does not guarantee that developers would not be willing to build new units, even if the

developer is forced to sell condos of higher value at a discount. The construction cost can
determine whether the developer can expect to make a profit or a loss. Up until the summer of
2008, the cost for building materials was at an all-time high. Since then however, we have seen a
dramatic reduction in the cost of materials. Labour is becoming cheaper, and we are able to
discern from the annual reports of developers that land prices are dropping. Without knowing the
extent to which costs are dropping, we are uncertain about the profitability of the developers
going forward. However, it remains a possibility that profitability for developers will improve in
the near future, even given the low .
Throughout this chapter, we have modeled the movement in condo prices using Geometric
Brownian Motion. In reality, the historical probability distribution of returns on New Housing
Price Index and Construction Price Index exhibit heavier tails. We leave the analysis involving
distributions with heavier tails as possible future work. Intuitively, we would expect that the risk
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profile increases for both the purchaser and the developer, and the presale contract value to
increase in order to compensate for the increased volatility.
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Chapter 3

3

Value of Urban Land under Regulatory Uncertainty

Real option price models have been widely used in the academic literature to model the value of
land. In this view, land is seen as being similar to a perpetual financial call option where the
underlying asset is the constructed building and the strike price is the development cost. The
common practice in the industry is to use the Net Present Value paradigm to calculate the value
of land. However, there are many complications specific to the real estate market that may lend
to the adaptation of the real options paradigm.
These different paradigms can lead to different land valuations, the usage of which can affect the
developers’ purchasing decisions. Given the same market price, a developer who places a higher
valuation on a tract of land may purchase and develop land, while a developer who values it less
may hold out. Accurate land values are important, as purchasing land based on a misleadingly
high valuation can lead to suboptimal profitability for the developer, whereas avoiding a
purchase based on a misleadingly low valuation may deprive the developer of a profitable
opportunity. In addition to enabling us to more accurately value land, the real options model also
allows us to analyze the development lags in the time between the purchase of raw land and the
development of lots.
In early real options literature, Titman ( 1985) valued underutilized urban land. He modeled
different payoffs according to the different heights of buildings that could be constructed, and
reasoned that it is rational to leave land underutilized in the hopes of realizing bigger payoffs in
the future. Grenadier ( 1996) introduced a game-theoretic approach to model the behaviour of
multiple land owners. He gave different valuations of land, differentiating between developers
who are first to develop and those who are last to develop. He used his model to explain why we
observe bursts of construction activity rather than developments at a steady rate.
Capozza and Helsley ( 1990) valued the option to turn agricultural land into urban land. In their
model, an irreversible decision can be made to construct a building on agricultural land. The
building earns rent which they assumed would follow Arithmetic Brownian Motion (ABM).
They explain that the irreversibility of their decisions causes developers to postpone
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development, which in turn reduces city size. Capozza and Li ( 2001) use their theory to explain
the positive relationship observed between interest rates and rate of land development.
Bar-Ilan and Strange ( 1996) present a more sophisticated model in a similar vein to Capozza and
Helsley. Rents are modeled to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), and decisions to
develop agricultural land are made reversible. Their model incorporated fixed development time
lags to explain the phenomena in which distant land is sometimes developed prior to nearby land.
Leishman et al. ( (2000)) conducted empirical research on builder behaviour to test the validity
of the real options based approach, but didn’t provide conclusive evidence either in support or in
opposition to the real option valuation approach. They stopped short of modeling the relationship
between house and land prices, instead relying on builders’ projections versus observed prices to
test the influence of uncertainty on land prices.
Buttimer et al. ( 2008) sought to model business realities more closely and used real options to
determine what effects holding presales had on the risk and return characteristics of subdivision
developers. While we agree with the intuitive concepts presented in their paper, we do not agree
with their mathematical formulation. For instance, their formula for the payoff to the
homebuilder is the following.
.
Here

is the completed lot price,

the price that builders pay for

is the strike and

is the presale option value. As an option,

should always be positive, and paying a higher price for the

option should cut into the builders’ profits. But according to the above formulation, a higher
translates into higher payoffs for the builders. Moreover, since

is a sunk cost, it should reside

outside the square brackets.
In general, discussions with developers lead us to believe that models in previous literature
overlook several significant factors. For one, building on land is not a one step process. For
residential land, subdivision developers face two decision points. They must decide when to
apply for a permit and commit to developing land, and after the permit has been granted, decide
when to fully develop land into lots so that they are ready for builders to start building. Builders
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purchase these lots and construct houses which they in turn sell to home buyers. Land is
therefore better modeled as a compound option.
Previous literature has assumed real estate prices follow either ABM or GBM. However, an
examination of price series such as the New Housing Price Index ( StatCan, 2009) or the
Macromarkets LLC repeat-sales index Lincoln Institute of Land Policy reveals that price
movements are cyclical around a growing mean. The usage of ABM or GBM can overstate the
uncertainty surrounding future real estate prices, particularly over long periods of time. The
Martingale property of ABM and GBM fails to explain the behaviour of some developers who
choose to sit on the sidelines during periods when they believe the market is overheated.
Only limited effort has been made to understand regulatory risk. There are many ways in which
regulation can significantly impact the value of real estate properties. Riddiough ( 1997) modeled
land values taking into account one form of regulatory risk in which governments have the
ability to confiscate property. Sunding et al. ( 2004) discusses the impact of environmental laws
which increases cost of construction and limits development scale, negatively impacting housing
prices. In some instances, the government has been known to grant development permits, only to
block development later through rezoning (e.g. Pacific National Investments Ltd. V. City of
Victoria, 2000).
Extreme forms of regulatory risks, such as confiscation of property and rezoning, occur only
rarely and most residential developers are not worried about their impacts. A more common
worry is compliance with environmental laws, but this can be incorporated into overall
development costs. However, permitting risk arising due to extensive waits to obtain
development permits, is a regular concern which can’t easily be incorporated into models
presented in previous literature. Developers told us that it takes a mean of 3 years and in
extreme cases, several decades, for development permits to be approved by the city of London,
Ontario. This introduces great uncertainty surrounding lot market conditions if and when permits
are approved.
In this chapter, we seek to value land by modeling the business of subdivision lot developers,
who are the major purchasers of residentially zoned raw urban land. By taking a real options
approach, our work is in a similar vein to Bar-Ilan & Strange and Buttimer, Clark, & Ott. We
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present a more sophisticated model that treats land as a compound option, introduces mean
reversion in lot price evolution, and incorporates permit application lag. On the other hand, we
also limit our model by stopping our analysis at the sale of completed lots. Earlier work expected
builders to value options as though they were retaining the finished properties for rental
purposes. However, our conversations with developers revealed that this is not the norm in
Ontario. Since we assume that developers do not retain possession of lots, we can assume that
the impacts of homebuilder behaviour are all subsumed in the market price of lots.
Our analysis focuses on the regulatory environment in London, Ontario, Canada. We utilize
public data available from published papers and government statistics, but our analysis also
derives from conversations with local urban planners, land appraisers, bankers and subdivision
developers.
Variable

Description

Value

S0

Current Lot Price

$415,000/acre

µ

Appreciation Rate

3%/year

ρ =ρ1=ρ2

Discount Rate

13%/year

σ

Standard Deviation of Lot Price

25%/year

η

Mean Reversion

0.7

R

Land Rent less Property Taxes

-$700/acre/year

I1

Phase 1 Costs

$85,000/acre

I2

Phase 2 & 3 Costs

$25,000/acre

Table 3-1: Parameter descriptions and base case values, placed at beginning of chapter for easy reference.
Base case values derived using information obtained from Sifton Properties and other sources.

This chapter is organized as follows. We provide an overview of business practices and
modeling assumptions in the next section. We then devote a section to formulating and solving
our real options model. In the following section, we estimate realistic values for our model
parameters. The next section contains our results under different market conditions and we
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compare our results against prevailing land prices. We also examine optimal decision points and
development time lags, as well as the risks associated with entering into development. We finish
with a conclusion.

3.1 Business Practices and Modeling Assumptions
Subdivision developers buy land with the intention of developing them into serviced subdivision
lots, and then selling them to builders. Sevelka ( 2004) gives a detailed overview of the business
process and risks involved in subdivision development. In summary, when developers hold raw
land, they pay property taxes and may receive rent from farmers or others.
Provided the land is zoned residential, they may apply to develop land into subdivisions. This
process may take several years, during which some development occurs. After receiving a
permit, they have the option to complete development as planned. Land can be viewed as a
compound option on subdivision lots with two exercise points – the first exercise occurring at the
time of permit application, and the second exercise occurring at the time of completion of
development. The permit application stage is referred to in the industry as Phase 1. Postapproval, there are two more stages of development until lots are completed. However, these
Phases incorporate no decision points so it is convenient to consider them as a single
development cycle which we denote by Phase 2&3. Developers state that permits, once granted,
don’t expire. We therefore assume that both component options are perpetual.
We assume that lot development and lot sales are made instantaneously. We think that these
simplifying assumptions are reasonable for the following reasons. Permit application typically
takes long enough that Phase 1 development is usually completed before permit approval, and
Phase 2 development occurs at the same time that lots are being marketed.
Developers may sell lots all at once or in piecemeal at an agreed price depending on the project.
In the case that they are sold piecemeal, we may regard our model’s lot prices as the Net Present
Value of the sold lots contained within an acre. We do not attempt to model cash flow structures
for the sale of lots because each development project is handled differently in this regard. The
following graph illustrates typical developer cash flows.
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Phase 1
Costs

Raw Land
•Pay purchase
amount
•Earns rent, pays
property taxes

3.1.1

Permit Application

Phase 2 &
3 Costs

Sell Lots

•Random
Approval time
•Earns rent, pays
property taxes

•All lots sold
instantaneously

Price Process of Developable Lots

Most previous literature that utilized real options didn’t distinguish between land and
developable lots. Lots have access to services such as sewers, electricity and storm water
management, unlike raw land. Lots are the end product produced by subdivision developers, and
we seek to model their price process. In previous literature, real estate assets were assumed to
follow GBM. However, discussions with developers revealed their belief that housing prices
follow a cyclical, or mean reverting process. Papers by Hwang and Quigley ( 2004) as well as
Capozza et al. ( 2002) confirm this view. To capture this behaviour, we assume the following
pricing process for lots
(3-1)

.

Under this price process, lot prices are drawn towards

in the long run. The strength of the mean

reversion is determined by . Unfortunately, analytic expressions for the probability distribution
of this process are unavailable. However if the condition

is met, the distribution of

is stationary and asymptotically converges to a gamma distribution (see Karlin & Taylor, 1981).
.
The 95% confidence interval for the process is shown in Figure 3-1. The confidence interval to
the left of the dotted vertical line is estimated using Monte Carlo simulations. The confidence
interval to the right of the line is estimated using the gamma distribution.
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Figure 3-1: 95% confidence interval for mean-reverting price process described in equation (3-1) for differing
values of . Other values used are

,

and

. The intervals to the left of the

dotted line were calculated using Monte Carlo simulations, and the intervals to the right are calculated using
the gamma distribution. The gamma distribution does not accurately describe the intervals for small time
periods.

3.1.2

Permit Approval Time

Obtaining a development permit is often a lengthy political process of uncertain duration. We
model the permit approval time using the inverted gamma distribution to satisfy these
characteristics. In London, Ontario, the mean length of time is around 3 years according to
developers. We don’t possess a similarly clear estimate for the standard deviation of permit
approval times. Upon examining the probability distributions using several numbers, we found
that using a standard deviation of 1 year produced a satisfactory distribution that included rare
instances of several decades long permit approval times. Unless otherwise stated, we use the
inverted gamma distribution with mean of 3 years and a standard deviation of 1 year.
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Figure 3-2: Probability distribution for the time taken for a developer to get a subdivision plan approved by
the local government. The distribution follows an inverted gamma distribution. Parameters for this
particular distribution were calibrated to yield a mean of 3 years and a standard deviation of 1 year.

Figure 3-2 displays the probability distribution histogram. The figure points to the small
possibility of a very lengthy permit approval waiting time. Our conversations with land
appraisers and bankers revealed that such lengthy wait times do occasionally occur, the evidence
of which supports our choice of distribution.

3.1.3

Land Rent

Before land is serviced into lots, we assume it earns rent from farming. It is possible to have
other uses for land before development – for instance, as a parking lot. However, examples of
such instances are relatively rare and we have decided such scenarios are out of scope for this
thesis. Subdivision developers purchase large tracts of land on the outskirts of developed areas.
To make use of the land as parking space, for instance, is not feasible since the space is usually
too large compared to the demand.
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The owner of land pays property taxes and in this chapter, we define rent as being the net posttax rent per acre. Property taxes are levied as a proportion of the value of land each year. The
property tax rate in the City of London in 2010 is 1.5% (City of London, 2010). For farm land,
the tax rate is a quarter of this at 0.375%. In our model, we assume that the land qualifies for
farm tax rate in the base case. In other words, if a developer purchases raw land for
$200,000/acre, the property tax is $750 in the first year. The estimation of taxes is problematic as
it is an input variable which depends on the output variable. To solve this dilemma, we choose to
use the Discounted Cash Flow estimate of the value of land to derive the amount paid in property
taxes. Although the DCF method gives a different estimate to that obtained by the Real Options
approach, the resulting small errors in the estimate of property taxes are immaterial, as we will
see.
We make the simplifying assumption that rent and lot prices both grow at rate µ. The assumption
is necessary to simplify the solutions of our model, as we shall see later. However, the
assumption is not without merit. Rent can be expected to rise with inflation. But also, rent can be
expected to rise as cities expand, making land closer and closer to the built-up urban areas. The
decreased distance between the land and the built-up urban areas opens up the land to more
competing uses of land (e.g. parking). Thus, rent goes up faster than the rate of inflation.
Similarly, we assume that property taxes also appreciate at rate µ. This is justifiable given that
land appreciates in value, and taxes, as a proportion of land values, increase at the same rate.
To estimate the annual rate of increase in farm rent, we analyzed data on US cropland rent.
Cropland rent has increased at a rate of 2.54%/year during the years from 2000 to 2010,
according to the United States Agricultural Department ( 2009). We do not have time series data
for lot prices, but we know that housing prices have increased by 3.91%/year during the same
period according to the Case-Shiller Index Standard and Poor's, which doesn’t adjust for the
increase in the quality of homes. Adjusting for the quality of homes is expected to yield a lower
rate of appreciation. Even if we don’t account for the quality of homes, the differences in rates
are statistically insignificant according to the two-sample t-statistic.
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3.1.4

Development Costs

Since land is modeled as a compound option, we separate development costs according to the
times in which costs are incurred. Phase 1 costs (

are chiefly comprised of roughly 70% of

the servicing costs, permit application fees and subdivision design fees. Phase 2 & 3 costs ( )
mainly include the remaining 30% of servicing costs and marketing costs. Servicing costs are by
far the biggest costs involved overall and include installation of sewers, storm water management
and electricity. We make the simplifying assumption that these prices increase at rate µ, the
average rate of appreciation of lot prices, in order to simplify our solutions. We have reason to
believe this assumption in the long run. If costs always increase at a slower pace, it is beneficial
for the land owner to leave land undeveloped indefinitely. If costs increase at a faster pace, every
developer will go out of business eventually.
There is uncertainty surrounding future servicing costs. As an example, servicing costs in
London, Ontario in 2010 were higher than in 2008, despite falling housing prices. This increase
was the result of a diversion of resources towards infrastructure projects resulting from the
Government of Canada’s economic stimulus plan. However, servicing costs do not fluctuate as
much as housing prices, varying at most 10% over a few years. Therefore, we assume that
servicing costs increase deterministically in our model, and we leave modeling uncertain
servicing costs to possible future work.

3.1.5

Discount Rates

In a typical real options analysis, the same discount rate is applied throughout the lifetime of
each project. However as we shall see in the results section, the application of uniform discount
rates yield results that are incongruent with observed developer behaviour. To remain flexible
between the choice of homogeneous or heterogeneous discount rates, we provide two symbols
for the two discount rates -

and

.

is the discount rate when raw land is held, and

discount rate when the development project is initiated. To use a uniform discount rate
throughout, we need only set
results section.

. We discuss the use of different discount rates in the

is the
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3.2

Model of Subdivision Project

We use the principles of dynamic programming as expounded by Dixit & Pindyck (among other
authors), to value land. We seek the optimal decision point that maximises expected profits, the
discounted value of which is the value of the development opportunity. The principles of
dynamic programming allow us to arrive at Bellman equations, which describe the relationships
between underlying lot prices and land prices. In this section, we describe the process by which
we arrive at the Bellman equations.
We hypothesize that there is a lot price

, at or above which it is optimal to apply for a

development permit. We first derive the equation that governs the price of raw land
when lot prices are below this value (i.e.
finished lot price
evolution of

and time . Since

according to

). We note that

depends on the

is stochastic, we use Ito’s lemma in order to describe the

and .
.

Here,

(3-2)

is the standard Wiener process. On average, the developer requires that her investment

appreciates at the discount rate. Having bought land, there are two ways that the developer earns
the discount rate while land remains undeveloped – through appreciation of the value of land,
and through rents collected. In mathematical terms, we have the following
(3-3)

.

Substituting (3-2) into (3-3) yields the following Bellman equation, which governs the price of
raw land before the permit application is sent.
.

When the permit is applied for, the developer is made to wait

(3-4)

years while the application is processed.

During the time that she waits, she continues to collect rent and completes Phase 1 development. When
the project is approved, she receives , the value of the permit-approved land. We assume the developer
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makes the decision to apply for a permit when lot prices reach

, a rational expected value maximizer.

Mathematically, this is expressed as follows.

(3-5)

In order to solve our equation, we need another condition. We observe that for prices under
value of land follows from solving equation (3-4). At

, the

, by definition, the developer is indifferent

between applying for a development permit and holding land hence (3-5). In addition, it turns out that
optimal solutions of Bellman equations may also be proved to have an additional degree of smoothness
at this boundary (see Dixit and Pindyck). The mathematical statement of this smoothness is:
.

(3-6)

Between equations (3-5), (3-6) and (3-7), we have sufficient information to compute the solutions for
, provided we know the value of permit approved land
attention to finding
by

. For

. We therefore turn our

. The price point over which it is optimal to exercise

is denoted

, the same process used to derive (3-4) can be used. We state the derived equation

below.
.

When

(3-7)

, the developer pays the Phase 2 & 3 costs and collects the subdivision sales revenue.

This is expressed mathematically as follows.
.

As was the case for

(3-8)

, we require the transition between pricing regions to be smooth for

.

.

(3-9)
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In order to solve the equations (3-4)-(3-9), it is convenient to make the following
transformations.
,

,

.

(3-10)

Further details of the solution process are given in Appendix E. The solutions are stated as
follows.
.

(3-11)

(3-12)

(3-13)

(3-14)

(3-15)

.

Here

is the confluent hypergeometric function (see Hassani, 1999). The function’s analytical

form is known, but it must be computed to within a finite tolerance as it is an infinite series. The
expectation procedure present in the bottom of (3-12) can’t be resolved analytically because we
don’t have the probability distribution of

for small . To evaluate the expectation,

we opted to use the Monte Carlo simulation method.

3.3

Base Case Parameter Estimation

In this section, we assign realistic numerical values to our parameters and compare the results of
our calculations to some commonly observed market values. If the observed market values are
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close to the values predicted using our model, we have evidence to support our claim that our
model incorporates key drivers of the land development business. During this process, among
other sources, we have relied on the information shared by Sifton Properties, one of the largest
developers in London, Ontario.
Sifton informed us that they expected lot prices to appreciate by 3% a year on average. This
number is close to the historical rate of increase of farm rents as well as house prices as
mentioned in the previous section on modeling assumptions. Sifton also stated that the market
price of finished lots is approximately $415,000/acre at the time of this writing.
Sevelka states that one developer they asked anticipated Internal Rate of Returns (IRR) in the
region of 12% to 15% excluding profit. Analyzing the minimum cash flow expected by Sifton
reveals an IRR closer to the lower end of the range. For the purposes of this chapter, we assume
a discount rate of 13%. To begin, we assume a homogenous discount rate – i.e. let

.

Estimating the volatility of lot prices is problematic. There is a dearth of information regarding
past lot sale prices. But even if we had access to such data, we would have to adjust the data to
account for ‘hedonic’ differences in lot characteristics such as lot size, desirability of
neighbourhood, and proximity to amenities. Instead of seeking out and using historical data, we
infer the volatility using two sources – the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and from
published papers.
CAPM hypothesizes that risk premiums are directly proportional to risks as measured by
volatilities. At the time of this writing on July 2010, the yield on a 3-5 year Canadian Treasury is
at roughly 2%, and has been so since the end of 2008. The historical non-inflation adjusted rate
of return on stocks is roughly 9%/year according to Damodaran. The MVX index TMX, which
measures volatility of Canadian stocks, has averaged around 17%/year from January to July of
2010. We therefore expect the Canadian stock market to yield a historical 9% a year, and we
assume 17% volatility for Canadian stocks. Assuming a discount rate of 13%, the volatility of
subdivision projects according to CAPM is 17(13-2)/(9-2)% = 26.7%.
We compare this figure with what we can infer from other sources. According to Davis and
Heathcote ( 2007), land prices are twice as volatile as house prices, and individual house prices
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are seen to fluctuate with a standard deviation of 11% according to de Jon et al. ( 2008). Using
these data, we infer that land prices fluctuate on the order of 22%. We compromise between the
two estimates of volatility and assume a rate of 25% in annualized units.
It is very difficult to estimate the strength of mean-reversion, given the paucity of data we have
to work with. We give our best guess based on our observation of sample simulated price paths
based on different values of η. When we set η to 0.3 and 0.5, the simulated prices were
frequently seen to move into unrealistic territories before falling back into normal levels. When
we set η to 0.7, the resulting simulated prices didn’t suffer from such extreme episodes as often,
even though they still occurred from time to time. Therefore, we choose to work with 0.7 as a
base case scenario.
Sifton has provided us with the following estimates of parameter values. Farm rent is minimal at
$100/acre. Soft costs committed with the decision to develop are typically around $25,000/acre
and servicing costs are estimated at around $85,000 per acre. Phase 1 costs are therefore
$25,000+0.7x$85,000=$85,000/acre and Phase 2 & 3 costs are 0.3x$85,000=$25,000/acre. The
mean permit approval time is roughly 3 years and, and Sifton believes a standard deviation of 1
year is reasonable.
To estimate property taxes, we need to examine the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation of
land. The components of the DCF calculations are outlined in Table 3-2.
Using $210,000/acre as an estimate of land prices, we can estimate property taxes to be 0.375%
of this amount, or $800/acre. Note that this amount is much greater than the $100/acre received
in rents, resulting in a net rent of -$700/acre. A summary of the variables and their base case
values are given in Table 3-1.

Time (years)

Cash Flow

Description

0

-$85,000/acre

Phase 1 Costs

1~3

$100/acre -0.375% of output

Land Rent less Property Taxes
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3

-$25,000/acre

Phase 2 & 3 Costs

3

+$454,000/acre

Expected Sales (Assuming 3% appreciation per year)

3

$210,000/acre

Discounted Total (Using 13% discount rate)

Table 3-2: Discounted Cash Flow valuation of Land

3.4
3.4.1

Results
Land Valuation under Homogeneous Discount Rate

Using our model, we calculated the value of land, the hurdle values and their sensitivities to
changes in parameter values. The results are summarized in Table 3-3.
The base case value of land is $219,000/acre. This corresponds quite closely with the going rate
of raw land in London, which we are told to be $225,000/acre. We can compare this figure
against one obtained using the Net Present Value approach with the following cash flows.
According to the cash flow chart, the fair value of raw land is roughly $204,000/acre, which is
roughly 7% lower than the computed Real Options value.
Changes in expected housing price appreciation (µ) significantly impact the value of land,
suggesting that industry outlook heavily influences the price of land. Similarly, changes in
discount rate (ρ) are also seen to significantly impact land values, suggesting that the risk
appetite of developers also play a big part in affecting land values. Changes in housing price
volatility (σ) appear to have less significant impact, suggesting that near term uncertainty plays a
smaller role in determining land values. This is understandable given the small option premium
we observe from our results. Option premium for a financial option can be calculated by
subtracting the option’s intrinsic value from its price. In applying the option valuation
methodology to land prices, we can substitute the intrinsic value with NPV, and the option price
with land price. In the deterministic calculation of NPV, σ plays no role, but it does influence the
real options-calculated value. The option premium is valued at $15,000 compared to a NPV of
$204,000, so by analogy to a deep in the money option, it is perhaps not surprising that changes
in σ don’t influence the value of land very heavily.
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Std. Profits

Variable

Change

Value of Land

Base Case

-

$219,000

0.52

1.08

$80,000

µ

+1%/year

+$15,000

0.5

1.12

$80,000

ρ

+1%/year

-$10,000

0.52

1.05

$79,000

Σ

+5%/year

+$3,000

0.46

1.13

$91,000

η

-0.2

-$2,000

0.47

1.04

$89,000

R

-$2400/acre/year

-$7,000

0.49

1.06

$81,000

I1

+$10,000

-$6,000

0.56

1.08

$79,000

I2

+$10,000

-$10,000

0.55

1.08

$80,000

Mean Permit Approval Time

+1 year

-$29,000

0.35

1.08

$77,000

Std. Approval Time unadjusted

+1 year

+$6,000

0.58

1.08

$90,000

Std. Approval Time ρ adjusted

+1 year

-$9,000

0.65

1.04

$91,000

Table 3-3: The value of land and the changes in its values according to different market assumptions. Here,
we assume ρ =ρ1=ρ2.
permit to develop.

is the optimal point at which the developer holding raw land should apply for the
is the optimal relative price at which the developer holding a permit-granted land

should complete development and sell the lots. Std. Profits denote the standard deviation of cash flows
obtained through 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations.

Changes in strength of mean reversion (η) seem to have little impact on the value of land.
Various η values determines the likelihood of extreme housing values in the future, but leaves
the expected value of houses unchanged. A change in η affects the value of land in a similar way
with σ, except the effects are even less pronounced given that it takes a few years for the
influence of η to manifest in housing prices. Increases in development costs negatively affect the
value of land, with I2 having less impact than I1. This occurs because I2 is paid later, and so is
more heavily discounted.
Increases in permit approval times negatively impact the value of land in a significant fashion,
which helps us understand why developers raise the issue of permit uncertainty as one of their
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primary concerns. Property taxes are seen to negatively impact the value of land in a fairly
significant way.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, increases in uncertainties surrounding approval times increase the
value of land. The increased uncertainty increases the value of the option premium, increasing
the value of land overall. However, this only holds because the discount rate remains the same
despite the increased uncertainty. It would be reasonable for a developer to demand higher
discount rates to compensate for higher uncertainty. We can determine the magnitude of change
in discount rates by applying the CAPM. Having already established that the risk free rate is 2%,
we can use the std. (standard deviation) of profits as the proxy for risk and use the following
formula. $80,000 refers to the std. of profits in the base case.
.

(3-16)

If we account for the change in the discount rate, an increase in uncertainties surrounding
approval times causes land values to fall.
The uncertainty surrounding realized profits are significant, as evidenced by the large standard
deviations of profits. Changes in certain parameters are seen to increase the risks surrounding
development. These parameters are volatility, degree of mean reversion and uncertainty
surrounding permit approval times. In particular, we note that an increase in one year to the
standard deviation of permit approval times has similar effects on profit uncertainties as
increasing lot standard deviation by 5%/year.
The optimal point of exercise to begin Phases 2&3 (

) is seen to be consistently above 1,

meaning that it is optimal to build lots when lot prices are above the expected lot price. This may
be surprising given the very high discount rate ρ, which penalizes waiting. However, the
disadvantage of waiting due to discounting is more than compensated by the advantage of
waiting for a boom in the real estate market. Because of the mean-reverting characteristic of lot
prices, the prices are expected to oscillate around the long term mean. Since the volatility is high,
the prices are expected to deviate greatly from this mean in the short run. The combination of
strong mean reversion and high volatility gives a high probability that the prices will deviate
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above the mean significantly in the near future, and the optimal decision is frequently to wait for
this deviation to occur.
is seen to be consistently extremely small. In all but the worst market conditions, our
equations suggest that the best decision is to never keep raw land in inventory with the hopes of
developing in some future date. The reason the values are so low lies with the high discount rate.
However, one might think that the discount rate should not be so high for raw land in the
inventory. Since lot prices are mean reverting, the value of the option to develop is stable in the
long run. Once development starts, short term volatilities dominate the riskiness of the project,
but such concerns are of less importance for raw land held for the long term.

3.4.2

Land Valuation under Heterogeneous Discount Rate

We assume two different discount rates according to the different stages of development. We
hold the discount rate for a project already in development at

. To determine the

discount rate in effect while holding raw land, we assume that the purchases are financed through
long term loans. As of the summer of 2010, the interest rates on corporate bonds in Canada rated
A or BBB with maturities of 10 years were approximately 5%. Therefore, we assume
as a base case. We have documented some of the results in Table 3-4.
We see a big change in the

values in the inhomogeneous discount rate model. Since

is

above 1 in the base case scenario, it is not optimal to develop the raw land immediately after
purchasing it. However,

of the base case is very close to the starting value of land of 1.00, so

the developer is expected to start developing very soon after purchase on average. This can be
seen by examining the duration of waiting times between land purchase and commencement of
development, as shown in Figure 3-3.

Variable

Change

Value of Land

Base Case

-

$220,000/acre

Std. Profits
1.01

1.08

$80,000
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ρ1

+1%/year

-$2,000

0.90

1.08

$80,000

ρ2

+1%/year

-$11,000

1.00

1.05

$79,000

µ

+1%/year

+$16,000

1.13

1.12

$82,000

η

-0.2

No change

1.12

1.04

$91,000

R

-$2100/acre/year

-$8,000

0.92

1.06

$79,000

σ

+5%/year

+$2,000

1.07

1.13

$90,000

I1

+$10,000

-$9,000

1.04

1.08

$80,000

I2

+$10,000

-$8,000

1.03

1.08

$81,000

Mean Permit Approval Time

+1 year

-$30,000

0.88

1.08

$76,000

Std. Approval Time unadjusted

+1 year

+$6,000

1.09

1.08

$91,000

Std. Approval Time ρ2 adjusted

+1 year

-$9,000

1.11

1.04

$90,000

Table 3-4: The value of land and the changes in its values according to different market assumptions, to
within ±$700/acre with 95% confidence. We assume different discount rates for the different phases of
development (ρ1=5%, ρ2=13%).
for the permit to develop.

is the optimal point at which the developer holding raw land should apply

is the optimal point at which the developer holding a permit-granted land

should complete development and sell the lots. Std. Profits denote the standard deviation of cash flows
obtained through 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations.

The wait time is less than 1 year in over 80% of the simulations, as can be seen by the results
shown in Figure 3-3. During this time, the value of the Permitted Option

is discounted by

a small rate. However in extreme cases, the developer may be left holding land in inventory for a
significant period of time – over a decade in some instances. Anecdotal evidence points to the
occurrence of such long waits, lending credence to our usage of different discount rates.
values are very sensitive to changes in input variables. Increases in

and R make it more

expensive for developers to hold undeveloped land, so they are willing to develop despite low
housing prices relative to the long term norm. Conversely, if prices are expected to increase at a
higher µ, they will wait until housing prices are above the trend line. If housing prices are
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volatile, developers are also willing to wait longer before developing, since there is an increased
chance that housing prices will swing up significantly. If development costs are expected to be
high, they are also willing to wait until housing prices are high, to mitigate the risk of
committing capital.

Figure 3-3: Waiting times between land purchase and commencement of development. Histogram is result of
50,000 Monte Carlo simulations under the Base Case scenario.

Although changes in mean reversion do not affect land values significantly, it seems to have a
big impact on

. If housing prices are less attracted to the long term trend line, big upward

deviations to the upside are made more probable. In such circumstances, developers will wait for
the possibility of “hitting the jackpot” in a heated housing market.
If developers believe that the permit approval process will take a long time, they will be willing
to develop despite low housing prices. A lengthier process means a lengthier projection
completion time, which means that capital is tied up for a lengthier period of time, and the
discount rate is applied for longer. Also, the developer is expected to pay more property taxes
during their wait. Higher uncertainty surrounding permit approval process has an opposite effect,
in that the developer will wait until high housing prices. Higher uncertainty makes developers
hesitant about committing capital.
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3.4.3

Valuation Discrepancies between Real Options and Discounted
Cash Flows

We are interested in determining the scenarios under which the real options valuation differs
significantly from the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach to valuation. Table 3-5 shows the
differences in valuations under changes in variables. Note that not every listed variable is used
for the calculation of DCF values. In such cases, the DCF values are the same as the base case.
Variable

Change

Real Options (/acre)

DCF (/acre)

Difference

Base Case

-

$220,000

$210,000

$10,000

ρ1

+1%/year

$218,000

$210,000

$8,000

ρ2

+1%/year

$209,000

$203,000

$6,000

µ

+1%/year

$236,000

$220,000

$16,000

η

-0.2

$220,000

$210,000

$10,000

R

-$2400/acre/year

$212,000

$205,000

$7,000

σ

+5%/year

$222,000

$210,000

$10,000

I1

+$10,000

$211,000

$200,000

$11,000

I2

+$10,000

$212,000

$203,000

$9,000

Mean Permit Approval Time

+1 year

$190,000

$184,000

$6,000

Table 3-5: Comparison of land values projected by real options model and the discounted cash flow model
under different market assumptions. The DCF tracks the real options valuation well under most
circumstances, but diverges significantly with higher µ.

The changes in the differences between the real options and DCF valuations are minor, for the
majority of variables examined in Table 3-5. The changes in the first discount rate, mean
reversion, servicing costs and volatility only change the differences by a maximum of
$2,000/acre. However, the option value of land increases with a rosy view of the market
(increased µ ), and the option value suffers under higher discount rate, higher real estate taxes or
longer expected permit approval time.
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Figure 3-4 shows the histogram of overall profitability for the developer, assuming the developer
pays the real options price for land. To have earned $0 signifies that the developer realized
normal profits – i.e. yields of

and

. In real terms, the risks are quite significant. There is a

real possibility that the developer will earn $200,000 less per acre than she had initially hoped
for when she bought land. When we compare this figure to the price of land we had just
computed (Approx. $222,000 per acre) and development costs (Approx $85,000 and $25,000 per
acre), we can understand why developers require such high discount rates to compensate for their
risks.

Figure 3-4: Histogram of excess profit – i.e. profit above normal profits. Histogram is a result of 50,000
Monte Carlo simulations under the Base Case scenario.

3.4.4

Development Lags and Policy Implications

Figure 3-5 shows the histogram of the waiting time between the moment a permit is granted, and
the moment the developer decides to complete development and sell off the lots. The pattern is
similar to that shown in Figure 3-3 where in most cases, development occurs immediately after
permit grant. But in a few cases, projects stall for a significant time period. From our
conversations with developers and bankers, we have found that this indeed occurs.
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Figure 3-6 shows the histogram of the total time taken from purchase of raw land to completion
of the development project. The histogram shows that there is significant uncertainty with
regards to the duration of development projects.
We have mentioned that

values are very sensitive to changes in the expected permit approval

wait times. Figure 3-7 shows the relationship between the mean permit approval wait times and
as well as land value. The results show that developers would be willing to pay more for raw
land and hold it longer in their inventories if they knew that permit approvals would be granted
expeditiously.
Uncertainty surrounding permit approval times can also affect developer behaviour. The effects
of different degrees of uncertainties, ρ adjusted, can be seen in Figure 3-8. We see a fairly steep
decline in land values for low standard deviations of permit times, and a levelling off thereafter.
This is primarily because changes in ρ are much more sensitive in the low standard deviation
regions.
It might be useful to imagine a dramatically different regulatory environment, where the
expected permit approval time is low, and where the uncertainties around approval times are also
low. If we expect a mean approval time of just 1 year, and a standard deviation of that time of
0.25 annual units, the value of the land is much higher at $305,000/acre, with

of 1.23. The

DCF model would yield $276,000/acre in comparison, suggesting that in a favourable regulatory
environment, the usefulness of the real options model would increase.

3.1 Conclusion
We have taken a closer look at the underlying business dynamics of residential land development
and we presented a real options model that incorporates some of the additional complexities
found. We found that the real options method yields a valuation of raw land that is consistent
with the going market rate of raw land.
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Figure 3-5: Waiting times between permit grant and finalization of development. Histogram is result of
50,000 Monte Carlo simulations under the Base Case scenario.

Figure 3-6: Histogram of the number of years taken from purchase of raw land to completion of
development. Histogram is result of 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations under the Base Case scenario.
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Figure 3-7: Plot of Mean Permit Approval Time vs Q* and Land Value. Land Values and Q* are computed
using Monte Carlo simulations with 500,000 runs. The shaded area indicates the 95% confidence interval of
Qstar. Standard deviation of approval time is fixed at 1 year.

Figure 3-8: Plot of Standard Deviation of Permit Approval Time vs
Land Values and

and Land Value, after adjusting for ρ.

are computed using Monte Carlo simulations with 500,000 runs. T. The shaded area

indicates the 95% confidence interval of

. Mean approval time is fixed at 3 years.
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The Net Present Value approach is also seen to give a value in a reasonable neighborhood, but its
deviation from the real options value may still prove significant. Its estimate of $210,000/acre is
some 5% less than the $220,000/acre estimated using real options approach under heterogeneous
discount rates, and the difference of $10,000/acre is 2% of the current going rate of finished lots,
valued at $415,000/acre. The difference in the rates that developers pay for land flows directly
through to the operating margin, where 2% may be considered significant. The usage of real
options valuation may entice the developer to buy land for which the NPV approach suggests is
too expensive. This is especially true in a very favourable regulatory environment, where permits
are granted expeditiously and reliably. We have seen that with mean approval time of 1 year and
standard deviation of 0.25 annual units, the option premium increases to $29,000.
Rent from farmers, which figures prominently in many past papers, does not appear to have a
significant effect on the price of land. On the contrary, property taxes make owning land a drain
on cash flows. If a piece of land can’t get taxed as farm land, the higher taxes significantly lower
the price of land.
The presence of permitting risk significantly influences the development project profitability
picture. Increases in the expected number of years to obtain permits significantly lower the
developer’s profit expectations, which translate into lower land valuations. Increases in the
uncertainty surrounding the number years to permit grants, without matching increases in
discount rates, has minimal affect on expected profitability while significantly increasing the
perceived risk of development projects. With matching increases in discount rates that
compensate for higher risks, profitability is affected in a major way. City planners may be
interested to see the direct economic impact of their permit approval process, even though this
knowledge is just one of many inputs to the complex task of land zoning.
Raw land is a compound option for which we need to apply different discount rates depending on
the different stages of development. This is seen to have little bearing on the price of land or the
risk characteristics of development projects, but it is an important assumption that explains the
behaviour of developers. If there was only a single discount rate and it was assumed to be at the
high figure of approximately 13%, we would have closely estimated at the prevailing price of
land, but we would not have had an explanation as to why developers chose to hold raw land in
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their inventories. Conversely, if the single discount rate was too low, we would have expected to
see much higher land prices.
In this chapter, we have introduced a model for land development that incorporates some of the
business realities that had been overlooked by existing papers. However, our model does not
incorporate some significant factors. Whereas we assumed fixed development costs in this
chapter, the costs are uncertain in reality, though not as uncertain as lot prices. The model
presented in this chapter could be improved by the introduction of such uncertainties.
Another factor that we have not incorporated concerns the use of presales. Each development
project is handled differently, but many lots are presold before development begins. The
presence of these arrangements is likely to significantly alter the risk characteristics of the
development projects. The introduction of such arrangements into the model are expected to
significantly add to the complexity of land valuation models as, depending on the details of such
contracts, time dependence might not be easily factored away from the model. Such a model
would require the solutions of a perpetual option with time dependent parameters.
In conclusion, our model reflects many of the business considerations previously unconsidered
by other papers, and in so doing gives fairly accurate estimates of land prices. Our model is also
useful for explaining the behaviour of developers and the impact of changes in regulatory risk to
their behaviours.
In this chapter on land valuations and in the previous chapter on presale of condominiums, real
options analysis offered only marginally different valuations for assets under analysis in
comparison to those offered by NPV analysis. The results point to a possible explanation as to
why real options analysis have not become widespread in the industry today. However, in the
next chapter, we show an example of a problem in which real options analysis draw significantly
different conclusions than those drawn by NPV.
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Chapter 4

4

Economic Value and Impact of Subsidies on Solar Panel
Installations

The rise of solar power in recent years has been nothing short of spectacular. The annual
production of solar Photovoltaics (PV) has risen from a mere 2 Megawatts in 1975 to an
estimated 40 Gigawatts in 2010 according to the European Photovoltaic Industry Association,
and the figures are likely to increase for the foreseeable future. The reasons for such dramatic
adoption of solar are numerous. Solar power is environmentally friendly, renewable, and
available in most regions.
Although the technology to harvest solar energy has existed for some time, few operational solar
power plants have been constructed until recently. The economic case for solar power plants has,
again until recently, just not supported their construction. Despite recent advances in
technologies in the form of increases in energy conversion efficiencies and lower manufacturing
costs, solar power is still not as cost competitive as traditional power plants using coal or natural
gas. In order to induce companies and individuals to build solar power plants, financial
incentives are necessary.
Some recent trends have led governments to provide such incentives to encourage development
of solar industries within their own jurisdictions. Increasing concerns about global warming has
led to political pressure to turn to environmentally friendly solutions such as solar power. Higher
oil prices have led some countries to be concerned about the high level of dependency they have
on oil for their continued economic growth. Oil is a non-renewable resource imported from many
countries vulnerable to political unrest. As a result, developed countries are looking to solar
power as part of their future energy policy mix. Finally, in the expectation that solar energy will
be a key technology for the future, many countries are adopting policies aimed at developing
world class solar industries within their own jurisdictions. When solar power becomes
competitive without the need for financial incentives, those jurisdictions with large solar
industries stand to benefit from increased economic output.
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Countries have provided various kinds of financial incentives to develop solar industries. In this
chapter, we have focused on a specific form of financial incentives - one provided to encourage
installation of solar panels on residential properties. The list of countries that provide such
incentives include Germany, Spain, Canada and the US, although not necessarily in the exact
form modelled here.
The ability to install solar panels on land or on rooftops adds value to these resources, and their
additional value can be calculated using the real options approach. Holding a tract of land or a
rooftop can be seen as being similar to holding a financial option. Analogous to being able to buy
an underlying stock at a contracted price, the owner of a land or a rooftop may choose to
generate solar power income after paying the installation costs. While there have been many
articles published on solar power plants from an engineering perspective, only a few articles
have analyzed them from a financial perspective.
Kumbaroglu et al. ( 2008) valued different types of power plants using the real options approach.
Their model incorporated expected learning curve cost reductions as well as input cost
projections, to evaluate each power sources’ financial merits. They used their results to project
the likely composition of future power sources under various regulatory scenarios, focusing
especially on Turkey. Solar power plants do not appear prominently in Kumbaroğlu et al.’s
research, and the idiosyncrasies inherent in solar plants were not factored into their financial
consideration in their paper.
Rehman et al. ( 2007) study the economics of building solar plants in Saudi Arabia. They
combine several different statistics including the amount of solar radiation available per region,
to project hypothetical power output of solar plants installed in each region. Utilizing
information on costs of solar plants, they calculate such measures as Internal Rate of Return, Net
Present Value (NPV) and the Cost of Energy.
The NPV approach uses a deterministic forecast of future power prices and installation costs.
However, power prices and installation costs do not fluctuate in a predictable fashion over time.
As we shall see, the NPV approach may therefore give misleading answers. In this chapter, we
take the real options approach to value the options, and to predict the behaviour of property
owners.
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In this chapter, our aim is to value the option of installing solar panels on residential properties,
and also to examine the property owners’ inclination to install panels under different forms of
government subsidies. In section 4.1, we examine the various economic factors under
consideration for solar panels, and build both our economic model and the resulting option
valuation model. In section 4.2, we detail our solution methodology. In section 4.4, we estimate
realistic values for the parameters we use. In section 5, we analyze the value of the opportunity
to the property owner under different subsidy schemes, and the resulting likelihood that rational
owners will choose to install panels. In section 6, we end with a conclusion.
Variable

Description

Value

P(0)

Starting Electricity Price

30¢/kwh

µP

Appreciation Rate of Electricity Price

0.6%/year

σP

Std. Dev. of Electricity Price

72.4%/year

I(0)

Starting Installation Cost

$10,000

µI

Appreciation Rate of Installation Cost

-0.5%/year

σI

Std. Dev. of Installation Cost

1.4%/year

δ

Rate of Decrease in Power Output

0.5%/year

Expected Annual Power Output per kW

1200kwh

C

Starting Annual Maintenance Costs

$87/year

µC

Appreciation Rate of Maintenance Costs

0.6%/year

τ

Life Expectancy of Solar Plant

20 years

Ρ

Discount Rate

4%

T

Option Expiry

Varies

X

Subsidies

Varies

Table 4-1: Parameter description and their base case values, placed at the beginning of the chapter for easy
reference.
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4.1 Model Specification
Solar panels generate revenue through sales of electricity, and electricity is typically sold to
electrical utilities and transmitted to end users. Electricity prices fluctuate stochastically in time.
The manner in which they fluctuate can be modeled quite differently depending on the choices of
time frames. For example, Knittel and Roberts ( 2005) provides an empirical investigation into
the hourly electricity spot prices. Hourly prices are characterized by heavy seasonality as well as
occasional spikes during times of high electricity demand. Hourly prices would be very useful
for a power plant which has variable costs and which have the capability to ramp up production
quickly.
However, solar panels provide electricity at no marginal cost, and it is therefore beneficial to run
them at full capacity at all times. Therefore, we can opt to model wholesale prices of electricity
over longer periods of time, which smoothes over short term fluctuations and produces average
electricity prices that fluctuate less dramatically.
Modeling monthly electricity prices is relatively straightforward. Figure 4-1 shows the Q-Q plot
of the natural log of monthly wholesale electricity prices, obtained from the Independent
Electricity System Operator IESO, a regulatory institution in Ontario. The monthly wholesale
electricity prices fit the lognormal distribution quite well. We provide the model for the price of
annual electricity prices using the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as described in equation
(4-1).
(4-1)

.

The

in equation (4-1) stands for the wholesale electricity price, and

rate of appreciation and standard deviation respectively.

and

are its annual

is a standard Wiener process.

The revenue generated from solar panels is also a function of the amount of sunlight ( ) panels
receive, as well as the rate of decline ( ) in the efficiency of the panels. We assume that this rate
of decline in efficiency is exponential, and we assume that

and

are independently

distributed. The expected discounted revenue over the lifetime of the panels is expressed
mathematically as follows.
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.

Figure 4-1: Q-Q plot of the natural log of monthly wholesale electricity prices as reported by the Independent
Electricity System Operator (IESO).

is the discount rate required by the owner, and

is introduced to simplify

notation. Note that since we only care about the expectation of
the distribution of

. Since

is constant,

, we can remain agnostic about

follows the same GBM process that

does.
Installation costs of solar panels have also fluctuated over the years. Increasing economies of
scale, learning curves and technological progress are expected to contribute towards lower
installation costs in the long run. Figure 4-2 shows the Q-Q plot of the natural log of monthly
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global solar module prices, which we use as a proxy for overall solar installation costs. The data
was provided by Solarbuzz, an international solar energy research and consulting company.

Figure 4-2: Q-Q plot of monthly global solar module prices, as provided by Solarbuzz.

While installation costs don’t fit the lognormal distribution as closely as electricity prices do, we
believe that the data fits closely enough for us to justify the usage of the GBM as an initial
model, leaving the usage of alternate distributions to possible future work. Equation (4-2)
describes the movement of installation costs.
.

stands for installation costs, whereas
standard deviation, respectively.

and

stand for annual rate of appreciation and

is a standard Wiener process.

(4-2)
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Once panels are installed, they must be maintained with an associated cost. We model these costs
to rise with inflation in the long run, but not to fluctuate stochastically. The resulting
maintenance cost model for time is given by

, where

is the rate of appreciation. The

maintenance cost over the lifetime of the panels is expressed as follows.
.
Here,

is introduced to simplify notation.

Governments may provide subsidies to encourage solar panel installations. These subsidies may
also vary over time. In this chapter, we consider subsidies which help lower the cost of
installations, and denote them by

. We assume

is deterministic.

When the owner of a resource decides to install the solar plant, the owner pays an up-front
installation cost, and receives revenue from selling electricity plus any subsidies, and pays
maintenance fees. The value of a solar installation is expressed in equation (4-3).
–

(4-3)

.

The Bellman equations for the option to build solar plants are shown in equations (4-4). The top
equation describes the evolution of the value of the option when the option to build the plant
remains unexercised. The bottom equation describes the value of the option when the option is
exercised. Equation (4-5) describes the final condition. The equations are similar to that
presented for a spread option, except our model must incorporate an increasing strike price.

(4-4)

(4-5)

.

signifies the exercise boundary, in which for
option – i.e. install the solar panels. If

, it is optimal to exercise the

is below the boundary, the owner is better off waiting.
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Note that there can only exist one
(top equation of (4-4)) with respect to

value for each

pair. The continuation value of

is a convex function, which slope varies from greater

than 0 to less than 1, and is always positive in value. The payoff (bottom equation of (4-4)) is
either 0 or have a slope of 1 with respect to . Such functions can only intersect once, and that
value is

.

4.2

Solution

Unfortunately, no analytical solution exists that solves such an equation, and we turn to
numerical methods. We proceed by following a similar set of principles as used by Kim ( 1990)
to solve the related American option problem for financial options.
First, we break down the time horizon into finite set of intervals. We also divide

and into

grids. At each point on the time grid , we have a choice to make: exercise or wait. If we
exercise, we receive

. If not, we receive the future option value

.

The decision on whether to exercise or wait, is based on the condition
from the last decision period
,

. We start

, and work our way backwards in time. At time

is the value in which the owner is indifferent to exercising or waiting,

expressed mathematically as follows.

.
The left hand side (lhs) is the value realized when exercised (the owner develops at that time),
and the right hand side (rhs) is the value realized when held (the owner waits to develop). Note
that since there is no decision point after

, the rhs is just the European option with

to

expiry. The expectation on the rhs can be expanded to give the following.

where

is the probability density function. Once we have computed

compute the option value

as follows.

, we are able to
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To compute

and

for earlier times, we compute recursively by applying the

following process. Assuming that we know values of

and

, we begin by finding the earlier exercise boundary

at time
from solving the following.
.

Using the solutions from above, we can calculate the value of our option.

We repeat the above process until we compute

4.3

.

Base Case Parameters

In order to generate realistic results, we estimate realistic base case values for all the relevant
parameters present in our model. We have used historical data to fit base parameters. There is no
guarantee the future will reflect past trends, but the past give us a good reference point to work
with.
The parameters that affect the economics of solar panels are location-specific. For instance, some
regions receive more sunlight than others. The price of electricity differs across regions.
Installation costs may vary according to the proximity to established solar panel servicers. In
this chapter, we assign base case parameters based on market conditions in Ontario, Canada
where solar power is a big focus of a provincial government initiative to “green” the power
supply.
Analyzing IESO’s monthly wholesale electricity price data suggests values of
and

. Analyzing solar installation cost data from SolarBuzz yields
and

.
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The expected annual power generation per kilowatt of installed solar units in Ontario is
approximately 1,200 kWh/year. The current installation cost is approximately $10,000/kW and
they are typically guaranteed to last at least 20 years according to OurPower, an Ontario solar
industry association. Information from OurPower also indicates that annual maintenance costs
begin at $87/year and is expected to appreciate by 0.6%/year. From conversations with various
solar module installers, we understand that solar power output will decline at the rate of
0.5%/year due to the aging of the panels.
It is difficult to determine the expiry of the option. For property owners who wish to install solar
panels on a rooftop, the lifetime of the option is limited by the expected remaining life of the
house. For ground mounted panels, the option is theoretically perpetual. However, there may be
conditions that further limit the lifetime of the option. For example, a property owner might be
mindful of the age of their shingles. It might be painful economically and logistically to uninstall
and reinstall solar panels on a roof in order to shingle roofs, and owners may wish to avoid such
a scenario. For our purposes, we investigate the value of the option over various timeframes.
Calculating

can be very computationally demanding, in the order of

Unfortunately, it is necessary to increase

and

when we increase

).

, in order to preserve

the accuracy of our results. We therefore show computational results up to a maximum of T=5
years with

of 1 year.

The discount rate is very hard to determine as it measures the risk appetite of the investor of solar
plants. In this chapter, we consider the risk neutral case and match the discount rate to the
interest rate of 20 year Canadian treasuries. As of April of 2011, this rate was close to 4%. We
leave the analysis of the effects of higher discount rates to future work.
The variables that go into the model, and the base case values discussed in this section, are
summarized in Table 4-1.

4.4

Results

In this section, we examine the economics of solar panel installations. We first conduct an NPV
analysis, and determine the appropriate policy action implied by the analysis. We then conduct
real options analyses under three different government subsidy structures – No subsidies, fixed
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subsidies and declining rate subsidies. Under each scenario, we examine the economics of solar
installations for property owners, and the effects that different subsidy regimes have on
influencing owners’ behaviours.

4.4.1

Net Present Value

It is straightforward to conduct an NPV analysis on a solar panel installation project. It is
calculated using the following formula, which is equivalent to the value of exercise of the real
option today.
–
One may note that

is influenced by the value of

the average annual rate of increase in electricity prices
analysis such as an NPV,

.
, because it is a consideration that affects
. Under a deterministic method of

should be set to 0. While this is true, we seek to preserve the annual

rate of increase of electricity prices in an NPV analysis. This means preserving the value of
and therefore we offset the (deterministic) absence of
Consequentially,

with an increase in the value of

,
.

is equal to the cumulative discounted revenue under a deterministic cash

flow model.
Under base case parameter values, the NPV of a solar installation project is calculated as
follows.
–

.

Since the NPV is negative, the model predicts that property owners will not install solar panels.
However, the model also predicts that if owners are given $5,422/kW or more in subsidies, the
project will become economical, and that we will see solar panel installations.

4.4.2

No subsidies

In this section, we show computational results of the real options model using the base case,
assuming no subsidies are granted to property owners. The results of the computation for various
values of T are given in Table 4-2. Using results for

, we perform a Monte Carlo simulation
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to examine the expected probability that owners could end up installing solar panels before
expiry (i.e. exercise the option early).
The value of the option increases with almost linearly with T. This phenomenon can be
explained by the low probability of an early exercise, or conversely a high probability of a
decision by the building owner to wait until the very end to install solar panels. As time passes
by, the value of solar panel installations increases, since electricity prices go up on average,
while installation costs do the opposite. Therefore, the owner “gains” economic value
proportional to the length of time she is able to wait.
T (years)
($/kW)

1

2

3

4

5

623

1,272

1,761

2,124

2,377

-

0.2

1.1

2.4

3.6

Prob. of early install (%)

Table 4-2: Computed values in dollars per kW, of the option to install a solar panel on a roof. The probability
that the building owner will exercise before the expiry day is also given, and is obtained through 200,000 runs
of Monte Carlo simulation. Results for various option expiries T are used.

The exercise boundary

for

is shown in Figure 4-3. The base case

shown as the circle in the figure also. If the ordered pair , are above the
indicate that it is optimal to install solar panels at

for given are
line, it would

. However, since it is below, it is optimal

to wait. In fact, the base case , are well below the boundary. For early exercise to occur,
future , would have to go above future

lines. Given the large gap that must be bridged,

it comes as no surprise that early exercises rarely occur.
As our results show, the optimal choice is to hold off installing solar panels as long as possible if
owners are not given any extra incentive. If policy makers want to encourage development of the
solar industry in their jurisdiction, some form of intervention seems to be needed.
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Figure 4-3: Exercise boundaries for t=0 and T=5 are in blue lines. The base case , coordinates are also
shown as red dots. Top left: No subsidies. Top right: Fixed subsidies of $5,422/kW. Bottom right: Initial
subsidies of $5,422/kW, declining at 10%/year. In all cases, the base case , are below the exercise
boundaries, indicating it’s optimal to wait before installing solar panels.

4.4.3

Fixed Installation cost subsidies

Some governments have chosen to give subsidies to those who install solar panels by way of
providing tax credits. Examples of such subsidies can be found in the U.S., where people can
take advantage of federal tax credits as well as state and county level subsidies if available – e.g.
Maryland (2008). According to our NPV analysis, subsidies of $5,422/kW would be adequate to
motivate property owners to install panels. In this section, we examine the effects of providing
such amounts to property owners.
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Just as important as the existence of these subsidies is the question of whether these subsidies
will still be around in future years. In this section, we examine the value of the option under the
assumption that the same amount of subsidies will be available until expiry of the option. The
resulting values of the option are given in Table 4-3.
T (years)
($/kW)

1

2

3

4

5

1,749

2,344

2,741

3,021

3,204

-

2.1

5.9

8.7

10.5

Prob. of early install (%)

Table 4-3: Computed values in dollars per kW, of the option to install a solar panel on a roof with fixed
subsidies of $5,422/kW throughout life of the option. The probability that the building owner will exercise
before the expiry day is also given, and is obtained through 200,000 runs of Monte Carlo simulation. Results
for various option expiries T are used.

The option to install solar panels is worth more if owners are given the assurance of subsidies,
than if no subsidies were offered. We also observe an increased probability that the owner will
install the panels early. It is easy to understand this result when we examine the exercise
boundaries as shown in Figure 4-3.
We see that the base case , is still below the boundary line, suggesting that it would not be
optimal for property owners to install solar panels at t=0. However, the gap between the base
case , and the boundary line is smaller than seen for the case with no subsidies. This makes it
more likely that future , coordinates would move above the boundary line, causing the owner
to install the panels before expiry.
The results suggest that the provision of subsidies encourages property owners to install panels.
However, it appears to be a costly policy given that providing $5,422/kwh only modestly
increases the chance of early installation. It is also worth contemplating why providing such high
level of subsidies only modestly improves the value of the options, which for the 5-year option
was in the order of $800. The answer lies in the fact that subsidies are only paid if and when
property owners decide to exercise. Since these probabilities are low, the values of options are
not as heavily impacted.
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The results run contrary to the conclusions obtained from NPV analysis, which states that
$5,422/kwh subsidies should be enough to spur property owners to exercise the option today.
NPV analysis ignores the fact that since solar installations become more economical over time, it
is often more advantageous for property owners to wait. This can be an important insight, as
policy makers attempting to encourage solar panel installations may be disappointed by the lack
of response generated from their subsidies, should they rely solely on insights provided by the
NPV analysis.

4.4.4

Declining Installation Cost Subsidies

Instead of providing fixed subsidies for the foreseeable future, governments may instead choose
to provide declining subsidies for the next number of years. One may reason that this policy
would encourage owners to act early before subsidies are reduced. In this section, we examine
the implications of implementing such a policy.
There are many ways of specifying subsidy decline curves. Governments may choose to
implement a straight line decline, reducing an equal dollar amount every year. However, such
decline curves are time-constrained; subsidies may reach 0 before the option expires. For our
purposes, we model the decline using an exponentially declining curve

, where

is the rate

of decline. Analysis using different decline curves could be considered in future work.
Rate of decline of subsidies

5%/yr

10%/yr

15%/yr

20%/yr

25%/yr

T = 2years

2.5

2.1

1.7

1.4

1.1

T = 3 years

8.0

7.8

7.0

6.1

5.2

T = 4 years

11.5

11.6

10.8

9.8

8.8

T = 5 years

13.6

14.1

13.6

12.9

12.1

Table 4-4: Probabilities of early exercise for different rates of declines, obtained using 200,000 Monte Carlo
simulations. Probabilities are examined for options with different maturities. Sample standard deviations are
approximately 0.05%.
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In order to find the optimal decline rate that produces the maximum probability of early exercise,
we’ve calculated exercise boundaries for different rates, and ran Monte Carlo simulations to
calculate the probabilities of early exercise. The findings are summarized in Table 4-4.
T (years)
($/kW)
Prob. of early install (%)

1

2

3

4

5

1,140

1,812

2,248

2,575

2,822

-

2.2

7.8

11.6

14.0

Table 4-5: Computed values in dollars per kW of the option to install a solar panel on a roof with declining
subsidies. Subsidies are initially $5,422/kW, and declines at the rate of 10%/year. The probability that the
building owner will exercise before the expiry day is also given, and is obtained through 200,000 runs of
Monte Carlo simulation. Results for various option expiries T are used.

The findings show that the optimal rate of decline is roughly 10%/year. When the declines are
too small, property owners don’t have the incentive to act quickly before the subsidies decline.
When the declines are too big, the owners may see that subsidies will never suffice to make the
projects economical. The values of the options, and the probabilities of early exercise using the
decline rate of 10% are shown in Table 4-5.
The results show lower valuations of the option to install solar panels in comparison to the
results under fixed subsidies. Given that subsidies decline over the years, this is to be expected.
The results also show increases in the probability of early installations, suggesting that the
prospect of lower future subsidies act as a positive impetus for property owners to install panels
early. If the government aims to encourage as many early installations as possible, reducing the
amount of subsidies appears to be an effective strategy. The exercise boundary under declining
subsidies is shown in Figure 4-3.
Under declining subsidies, the gap between the boundary line and the base case , coordinates
is smaller than it is under fixed subsidies. This signifies that owners are aware that subsidies are
declining, and need a smaller push to get them to install solar panels.
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4.5

Conclusions

In our paper, we have valued the option to install solar panels, and investigated the implications
of introducing different subsidy regimes aimed at encouraging solar panel installations. At the
time of this writing, most residential properties are not big enough to install more than 5kW of
generative capacity. For properties where up to 5kW can be installed, if we assume that the
option to install panels expire in 5 years, the value of the option is worth roughly $12,000 with
no subsidies. This value goes up to roughly $16,000 with fixed subsidies of $27,000. While these
numbers are not insignificant, they are but a few percentages of the overall housing prices in
Ontario, are typically valued over $300,000. Therefore, while they certainly enhance the value of
properties, the introduction of these options is not expected to generate significant “buzz” in the
housing market.
From a policy point of view, it is seen that providing subsidies encourages property owners to
install solar panels. The NPV analysis shows that subsidies of $5,422/kW should be enough to
entice property owners to install panels today. Even though this is over half of the overall
installation costs, it is still not enough when viewed from the real options framework. As seen in
Figure 4-3, a significant additional amount is required to entice owners to install panels today.
Rather than fixing subsidies, governments who wish to encourage solar panel development can
be more effective by introducing subsidies that decline over time. This has the same effect of
retailers putting up limited time sales signs on their merchandise, enticing consumers to spend
before the bargains end. A high initial subsidy coupled with a moderate decline may give enough
incentive for property owners to exercise their options to install panels today.
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions

In this thesis, we’ve created real options models for different classes of real estate assets, putting
special emphasis on bridging the gap between theory and reality by considering input from
industry sources. In particular, we have focused on modeling three types of assets – presale
contracts of condominiums, raw urban land and properties on which solar panels may be
installed. We’ve chosen these projects both because they are of industries that touch the lives of
many, and because, for them, relevant industry contacts were relatively easy to obtain. Real
options analysis had not previously been applied extensively to these types of assets, and in each
of these types, conversations with industry decision makers has led us to create models which
differed materially from those that had been created by other authors. In addition, this thesis had
been written with broader usage of mathematical tools than had been generally used so far in the
applied real options literature. The usage of these sophisticated tools was necessary to capture
some important idiosyncrasies found in assets.
In each of the problems we’ve analyzed, we compared and contrasted the merits of using a real
options approach against more traditional business valuation approaches. We used the models to
value the assets under consideration, and to determine profit maximizing decisions. We have
seen that in the presale condominium and land development problems, real options do not
provide valuations that materially contrast with valuations provided by the NPV approach. The
benefits of the real options approach may not be compelling enough for popular adoption.
However, in the case of land development, using the real options approach may explain the
behaviour of land developers in ways that the NPV approach can’t, and thus real options models
may be useful for policy makers. In the solar panel problem we see that the real options method
yields very different results, both in terms of value of the opportunities and the expected rational
behaviour of property owners, from those inferred from using the NPV approach. The analysis
derived from the real options approach may be critical for both property owners and policy
makers.
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There are many more opportunities to apply real options to the area of real estate. Throughout
this chapter, we had assumed that real estate prices move following a GBM process with the
exception of chapter 3. However, this is only an approximation, and certainly for short and
possibly also for long durations, GBM becomes less representative of real estate price
movement. This is because over the short term, real estate prices exhibit momentum. In chapter
3, we introduced mean reversion into our model, which significantly altered the long term
behaviour of real estate prices. However, introducing mean reversion did not address the
exhibition of short term momentum.
As an appropriate example of a project where a more sophisticated process might be needed, we
can take the valuation of subdivision lots. Subdivision lots are an option to build a building. A
typical detached residential home takes less than a year to build. Momentum in real estate prices
could significantly influence the willingness of builders to purchase lots. Even if you could
model short term momentum, land developers probably can’t take advantage of such models, as
the time horizon to develop land typically outlasts the effects of short term momentum.
However, one could model the value of lots as an option to construct buildings, from the
perspective of a builder. Such models could benefit from incorporating short term momentum,
possibly from utilizing delay equations.
One could also take the solar power project further. In this thesis, we have examined subsidy
regimes of the kind that gave tax credits to solar panel purchasers. However, many countries
subsidize solar power differently, by guaranteeing purchase of electricity generated from solar
panels at a higher price; this is called a feed in tariff. Jurisdictions which provide such feed in
tariffs include Germany and Ontario, among others. The presence of feed in tariffs implies the
need to create a different model to examine the value of the option to property owners, as well
as to analyze the impact of incentives on the willingness of owners to install panels.
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Appendices
A. Analysis of Lai et al. ( 2004)
This appendix provides a detailed discussion of Lai et al.’s analysis for the purchaser, which is
described on page 341 and Appendix A in their paper. We suppose that the purchaser will make
a first payment of

at

. At

the purchaser can either make an additional payment

and thus obtain ownership of the unit or she can pay a penalty of

in order to get out of the

contract. It is clear that she will only make the additional payment if

where

is the

the spot price of a similar unit at the open market at time .
We suppose that

where

is given by the stochastic differential equation

is the expected growth rate of the unit price,

is the volatility and

process. We will suppose that the purchaser is risk neutral so we can replace
interest rate

. Let

is the Wiener
by the risk free

be the value of the presale option at time and price . Hence we can

write the Bellman equation in the form
(0-1)

.

The final condition at

can be written in the form
.

Lai et al. claim that they can replace
last payment and is a function of

by

(0-2)

and state that

(a percentage) and

is “the amount of the

(the expected spot price at the

end of the last period)”. It is not clear what they mean by this statement. At the very least
surely must be a function of . However, their analysis implies that they treat it as a constant.
They also replace the penalty

by

where again they state that η is a percentage which

they treat as constant. Thus they replace (0-2) by
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(0-3)

.

Since the last term in this condition depends on ,

vanishes at

. Thus they get the two

boundary conditions
,

(0-4)

.

Thus they get the solution (their equation A4)
.
Where
.
This solution is linear in , so the second derivative term in (0-1) is identically zero, so
be relevant in their solution. Despite this,
risk free interest rate

cannot

does appear in their solution. It is also odd that the

does not appear in their solution.

Our position is that we cannot replace the final payment

by

and the penalty

. Instead we must carry out the calculations using these quantities,

by

and , directly.

B. Modeling Assumptions for Chapter 2
We assume that the price movements of condominiums can be modeled by Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM). As with stock prices, GBM does not completely fit the behaviour of condo price
movements, but we choose it for its analytical tractability.
We use the New Housing Price Index (NHPI) and Construction Price Index (CPI) to calibrate
our model parameters, which are provided by Statistics Canada (StatCan). These can be found in
the Government of Canada’s CANSIM database (StatCan, 2009, StatCan, 2009). The NHPI
tracks the monthly average housing price across all major metropolitan regions within Canada.
The index adjusts for the change of quality in houses.
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The CPI is compiled by measuring quarterly changes in building contractors’ quoted prices. It
excludes land, design, development charges and real estate fees. Development charges are fees
payable to the government. It would be reasonable to include the charge as part of our
construction cost, but the size of the charge is immaterial relative to the total cost City of
Vaughan (e.g. order of $10,000 in the 2009), and so contributes little to the growth of the total
construction cost. We therefore do not take it into account.
The graph of the NHPI is shown in Figure 0-1, along with the construction price index. The
histogram of the log return of the index is shown in Figure 0-2. We see that the returns exhibit a
distribution with heavier tails than the normal distribution. However, we think it is close enough
to a normal distribution that we can gain insight into the market by approximating the returns
with a normal distribution. The distribution of the CPI behaves similarly to the NHPI, and so we
also model it using the lognormal process. This is similar to the treatment of construction cost
proposed by Wang and Zhou (2006), who however modeled construction cost as a series of cash
flows, whereas we model it as a lump sum.

Figure 0-1: Quarterly New Housing Price Index and Construction Price Index, as provided in the CANSIM
database by Statistics Canada (1997 price = 100)
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Figure 0-2: Histogram of the of the monthly New Housing Price Index. The histogram shows that, while the
normal distribution is not perfect as a model for monthly logarithmic returns, it is reasonable for purposes of
our analysis

There is some evidence of autocorrelation in the housing and construction index returns in Fig. 9.
However, this would only significantly impact our model if the purchasers and developers could
trade the partly constructed condo. In such a scenario, the use of GBM would paint a flawed
picture about the profitability for both the purchaser and the developer. However, the underlying
cannot be traded while the contract is in effect, and only the initial and the final prices of the
condominium matter. The returns on condominium prices four years from the starting period do
not seem to bear any significant autocorrelation, and we can treat the condo price as making one
geometric Brownian “leap” from period t = 0 to t = T, with T being four years.
However, the change in expectations of final condo price due to the autoregressive nature of the
price series cannot be ignored. Rising prices in the last few months may lead a purchaser to
expect higher final prices than she would if prices had been falling. We can keep our assumption
of GBM for condo prices while incorporating the change in price expectations by adjusting . To
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find a

that appropriately reconciles the change in expectations, we need to analyze the

autocorrelation in the NHPI data.

Figure 0-3: Scatter plot of log returns of monthly New Housing Price Index. Plotted returns of period
, where

vs

is 3 months for the left graph, and 4 years for the right graph. The left graph shows some

evidence of pricing momentum in the short term—upward price movement is likely followed by another
upward price movement, and vice versa. Over 4 years, the relationship between price movements is weaker.
Expectations of condo prices at the time of completion is not affected by the movement in condo prices at the
time of the presale agreement since those dates are 4 years apart

The Partial Autocorrelation Function of the log returns of the NHPI is shown in Fig. 10. The
graph indicates that it would be a good idea to use either an AR(2) or an AR(5) model. The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) using the Ordinary Least Squares method supports the use
of AR(2), while AIC using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method supports the use of
AR(5). We choose to employ AR(5) because the AIC ranking in support of AR(5) is marginally
more decisive. This yields the following

.
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In order to take the auto regression into account, we can set the expected annual rate of
appreciation

to be

which equals the following
.

where

through

(0-5)

are the monthly returns on housing for the previous 5 months. By equating

to Eq. (0-5), we are able to match our expected appreciation using GBM model over four years
to be the same as the expected appreciation implied by the AR(5) model. However, this is not a
hard and fast rule. We are free to forecast the value of

using different methods. Equation (0-5)

was merely derived to show that if we choose to, we can incorporate the expectation of the final
condo price as implied by AR(5) model in the GBM model.

Figure 0-4: The Partial Autocorrelation Function of NHPI log returns. The results confirm the existence of
short term pricing momentum in condo prices

Weighing all these factors and considering the significant analytic simplification, we feel that
using geometric Brownian motion is adequate to describe the uncertainties associated with the
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price of a single condominium. By the same logic, we also model the construction cost of
condominiums to follow a geometric Brownian motion. The Q-Q plot and the histogram of the
returns of CPI are very similar in shape to that of the returns of NHPI.
Rosenthal ( 1999) finds that construction cost and housing prices are cointegrated. To capture the
connection between the two without sacrificing analytic tractability, we instead assume the two
time series are correlated, and we denote the correlation as . Any long-term divergence between
construction cost and condo price would lead to increasingly greater or smaller profitability for
the developer. This leads to our assumption that condo prices and construction costs appreciate at
the same rate . Our view is validated by comparing the average returns of the NHPI and CPI.
However, this does not preclude a divergence of condo and construction prices on a given
realization, particularly in the short term.

C. Analytic Solution to Purchaser’s Position
The Bellman equation we are trying to solve is identical to the well-known Black Scholes
equation, but with the rate of return on an asset allowed not to equal the risk free rate. The
fundamental solution of this equation is

.
Given our final condition
.
and defining

to be the following
.

Our solution can be obtained by computing the following
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.

Our calculations become much more easy to follow if we use the following easily verifiable
relationships.
,
,
,
.

Using the above relationships, the value of a presale contract from the purchaser’s point of view
is found to be
.
Where

,
.

D. Variance of Purchaser’s Profitability
We calculate the variance of the profitability for the purchaser when she holds the contract
without employing any hedging strategies. We do this by calculating the value of the option at
time , which is equal to the payoff of the option.
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.

.

Where

.
To ease notation, denote

,

with mean 0 and standard deviation of

and

. Since W is normally distributed

,

.

where, as for the purchaser’s solutions, we have

,
.

Substituting our answer for

in the full expression for the variance yields
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.

E. Solutions to Bellman Equation for Land
Variable

presented in (3-10) can be interpreted as the degree of deviation from the expected

evolution of lot prices. The transformation removes the time-dependence of the original Bellman
equations. The new coefficients of
both perpetual options,

and

and

terms are time-independent, and since

and

are

are also time-independent. The transformed Bellman equations

are as follows.
(0-6)

.

,

.

.

(0-7)

,

.

Equations (0-6) and (0-7) are similar to perpetual options on underlying assets following an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We can therefore follow a similar logic used to solve the OrnsteinUhlenbeck equation to solve our equations. The solution to the transformed permit option
given by equation (3-13)-(3-15). Both

and

is

must be determined numerically using the two

boundary conditions.
The above result can be used to compute the values of the boundary conditions for . Since we
don’t have the probability distribution function of

in analytical form, we use Monte

103

Carlo simulations to take expectations on
given

. We generate many values of

and compute the average. Equation (0-6) is solved using the same process used to

solve equation (0-7). The solution of

is given by equation (3-12).
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